Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes

Schmidt, Sebastian

doi:10.1080/00048402.2022.2055093

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

2022

DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2022.2055093

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Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes

Sebastian Schmidt

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Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…This view has primarily been defended byBoult (2020Boult ( , 2021aBoult ( , 2021b). It's also accepted inSchmidt (2021Schmidt ( , 2022 and discussed in Greco (forthcoming).…”

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confidence: 96%

Scepticism about epistemic blame

Smartt

2023

Philos Stud

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I advocate scepticism about epistemic blame; the view that we have good reason to think there is no distinctively epistemic form of blame. Epistemologists often find it useful to draw a distinction between blameless and blameworthy norm violation. In recent years, this has led several writers to develop theories of ‘epistemic blame.’ I present two challenges against the very idea of epistemic blame. First, everything that is supposedly done by epistemic blame is done by epistemic evaluation, at least according to a prominent view about the social role of epistemic evaluation. Parsimony considerations count against introducing an idle mechanism that does the same work as an existing one. Second, no current theory of epistemic blame includes a plausible account of the force of epistemic blame or the practices that could express it. I conclude that we should give up the notion of epistemic blame.

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“…This view has primarily been defended byBoult (2020Boult ( , 2021aBoult ( , 2021b). It's also accepted inSchmidt (2021Schmidt ( , 2022 and discussed in Greco (forthcoming).…”

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confidence: 96%

Scepticism about epistemic blame

Smartt

2023

Philos Stud

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“… 3 For a potential argument that this distinction is not a real one, since the history and consequences of the belief make the belief itself wrong, see Schmidt (2022). …”

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confidence: 99%

Social Group Moral Encroachment

Mitova

2023

Episteme

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According to moral encroachers, the moral stakes of a belief partly determine how much evidence we need for the belief to count as knowledge. This view concerns the beliefs of individual believers. In this paper, I argue for a social group version of moral encroachment: dominant groups, such as white people or men, need to have more evidence than the marginalised in order for some of their beliefs to constitute knowledge. I argue for this claim in three steps. First, I spell out the group moral stakes involved – the harms dominant knowers cause the marginalised and the knowledge economy. Second, I show off the theoretical benefits of having the notion of social group moral encroachment at our disposal: it can be an invaluable tool for decolonial and feminist epistemologists if they want to avoid the relativistic ring to their views (a ring that tends to put off many well-wishers). Finally, I start on a positive account of social group moral encroachment by addressing a potential puzzle and responding to objections.

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Doxastic dilemmas and epistemic blame

Schmidt

2024

Philosophical Issues

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What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something that we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to (cause ourselves to) believe, period. More recent accounts challenge this view, either by arguing that there is something that we ought simpliciter to believe, all epistemic and practical reasons considered (the weighing view), or by denying the normativity of epistemic reasons altogether (epistemic anti‐normativism). I argue against both accounts and defend the traditional view. An agent can be blameworthy in doxastic dilemmas for complying with their practical but not their epistemic reasons. This reveals how epistemic reasons are normative: the concept of epistemic blame helps us track epistemic normativity.

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Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes

Cited by 3 publications

References 36 publications

Scepticism about epistemic blame

Scepticism about epistemic blame

Social Group Moral Encroachment

Doxastic dilemmas and epistemic blame

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