Blame It on the AI? On the Moral Responsibility of Artificial Moral Advisors

Constantinescu, Mihaela; Vică, Constantin; Uszkai, Radu; Voinea, Cristina

doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00529-z

Cited by 17 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…The results of the present study confirm the necessity to define clear rules to regulate the way artificial moral advisors are trained and used in everyday life (e.g., Constantinescu et al, 2022;IEEE, 2017;Kobis et al, 2019;Russell et al, 2015). Some authors have proposed to adjust the "behavior" of artificial moral advisors to the moral preferences of the user (e.g., Giubilini & Savulescu, 2018), which appears as a good solution at least for a personal use of this technology.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 80%

Making Moral Decisions With Artificial Agents As Advisors. AnfNIRS Study

Fabre,

Mouratille,

Bonnemains

et al. 2024

Preprint

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Artificial Intelligence (AI) is on the verge of impacting every domain of our life. It is now being increasingly used as an advisor to help make (moral) decisions. The present study aimed at investigating the influence of moral arguments provided by AI-advisors (i.e., decision aid tool) on human moral decision-making and the associated neural correlates. Participants were presented with utilitarian and deontological sacrificial moral dilemmas and had to make moral decisions either by themselves (i.e., baseline run) or with AI-advisors that provided either utilitarian or deontological advice (i.e., AI-advised run), while their brain activity was measured using an fNIRS device. Overall, AI-advisors significantly influenced participants, who often modified their decisions according to AI-advisors arguments. Longer response times and a decrease in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity were observed in response to deontological arguments than to utilitarian arguments. Besides triggering a conflict in participants, being provided with deontological arguments by machine appears to have led to a decreased appraisal of the affective response to the dilemmas. This resulted in a reduced level of utilitarianism, supposedly in an attempt to avoid behaving more like a machine than the machines themselves. Taken together, these results contradict Greene s moral dual-process theory and suggest that motivational power can led to a voluntary up- and down- regulation of affective reactions.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 80%

Making Moral Decisions With Artificial Agents As Advisors. AnfNIRS Study

Fabre,

Mouratille,

Bonnemains

et al. 2024

Preprint

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“…Two approaches come to mind. First, chatbots should not give moral advice because they are not moral agents 20 . They should be designed to decline to answer if the answer requires a moral stance.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

ChatGPT’s inconsistent moral advice influences users’ judgment

Krügel

Ostermaier

Uhl

2023

Sci Rep

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ChatGPT is not only fun to chat with, but it also searches information, answers questions, and gives advice. With consistent moral advice, it can improve the moral judgment and decisions of users. Unfortunately, ChatGPT’s advice is not consistent. Nonetheless, it does influence users’ moral judgment, we find in an experiment, even if they know they are advised by a chatting bot, and they underestimate how much they are influenced. Thus, ChatGPT corrupts rather than improves its users’ moral judgment. While these findings call for better design of ChatGPT and similar bots, we also propose training to improve users’ digital literacy as a remedy. Transparency, however, is not sufficient to enable the responsible use of AI.

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“…In this article we follow the mainstream approach and adopt the standard Aristotelian view of friendship. The main reason for taking this stance is that we consider it is still robust and relevant today, in particular because the broader framework of virtue ethics has already proved useful in inquiries over moral status, moral agency and moral responsibility in the fields of machine ethics ( Wallach and Allen, 2008 ; Howard and Muntean, 2017 ) and Human-Robot Interaction ( Cappuccio, Peeters and McDonald, 2020 ; Peeters and Haselager, 2021 ), and even more when applied to robotic AI systems ( Hakli and Mäkelä, 2019 ; Coeckelbergh, 2020 ; Sison and Redín, 2021 ; Constantinescu et al, 2022 ). Another reason is because we consider that alternative contemporary accounts of friendship did not (yet) provide sufficient grounds for us to give up the standard Aristotelian account, but rather to annotate it.…”

Section: Robot Friendship Moral Agency and Virtue Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the Aristotelian framework, conditions for moral agency and moral responsibility are inherently intertwined with conditions for virtue of character, for it is only when individuals act as a result of their virtue or vice that we might hold them praise- or blame-worthy ( Meyer, 2011 ). Drawing on these Aristotelian distinctions, in order to be a moral agent and bear moral responsibility, one needs to be able to 1) causally generate an outcome while 2) acting freely, uncoerced, and 3) be knowledgeable of the contextual circumstances of their action, following 4) deliberation based on rational choice, involving reason and aforethought (for a broader discussion see Constantinescu et al, 2022 ). Aristotle’s discussion over these four criteria highlights that children are not yet moral agents because they lack deliberation ( prohairesis ), which is a constitutive condition of moral agency and moral responsibility, requiring agents to be able to act based on rational choice.…”

Section: Robot Friendship Moral Agency and Virtue Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Children-Robot Friendship, Moral Agency, and Aristotelian Virtue Development

Constantinescu

Uszkai²,

Vică³

et al. 2022

Front. Robot. AI

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Social robots are increasingly developed for the companionship of children. In this article we explore the moral implications of children-robot friendships using the Aristotelian framework of virtue ethics. We adopt a moderate position and argue that, although robots cannot be virtue friends, they can nonetheless enable children to exercise ethical and intellectual virtues. The Aristotelian requirements for true friendship apply only partly to children: unlike adults, children relate to friendship as an educational play of exploration, which is constitutive of the way they acquire and develop virtues. We highlight that there is a relevant difference between the way we evaluate adult-robot friendship compared to children-robot friendship, which is rooted in the difference in moral agency and moral responsibility that generate the asymmetries in the moral status ascribed to adults versus children. We look into the role played by imaginary companions (IC) and personified objects (PO) in children’s moral development and claim that robots, understood as Personified Robotic Objects (PROs), play a similar role with such fictional entities, enabling children to exercise affection, moral imagination and reasoning, thus contributing to their development as virtuous adults. Nonetheless, we argue that adequate use of robots for children’s moral development is conditioned by several requirements related to design, technology and moral responsibility.

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Blame It on the AI? On the Moral Responsibility of Artificial Moral Advisors

Cited by 17 publications

References 55 publications

Making Moral Decisions With Artificial Agents As Advisors. AnfNIRS Study

Making Moral Decisions With Artificial Agents As Advisors. AnfNIRS Study

ChatGPT’s inconsistent moral advice influences users’ judgment

Children-Robot Friendship, Moral Agency, and Aristotelian Virtue Development

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