Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation

Magliocca, Gerard N.

doi:10.31228/osf.io/z4tkf

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…So far, there is still not a uniform definition of low-quality innovation in academic research. Inactive patents are generally regarded as dormant patents and are used to be a proxy for low-quality innovations [42]. The existing literature believes that the longer the patent rights last, the higher the value of the patent [43][44][45][46].…”

Section: Low-quality Innovationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Administrative Approval Impede Low-Quality Innovation? Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firms

2020

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Sustainable economic development is tightly connected to substantial innovation which can be improved by reducing low-quality innovation. This paper constructs a theoretical framework to present the ultimate relationship between administrative approval and sustainability. In order to verify the research hypotheses, we define the dormant patents whose patent rights are terminated due to non-payment of renewal fees to measure the low-quality innovation of Chinese manufacturing firms. By using the merged firm-level data between 1998 and 2007 and collected information on whether a city establishes the administrative approval center (AAC), and employing a difference-in-difference (DID) approach, we identify the impacts of administrative approval and firms’ low-quality innovation. First, the results reveal that administrative approval reduces the firms’ low-quality innovation. Second, administrative approval has a smaller impact on the low-quality innovation for state-owned enterprises (SOE). Third, three mechanisms are uncovered through which administrative approval impedes low-quality innovation: enhancing market competition, changing the direction of innovation, and optimizing research and development (R&D) investment strategy.

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Section: Low-quality Innovationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Administrative Approval Impede Low-Quality Innovation? Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firms

2020

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“…As we discuss below, they can provoke hold-up situations favoring trolling and reducing the efficiency of markets for technology (Pénin, 2012). Consequently, bad patent information quality will provide lower outlicensing and/or monopoly profits for technology sellers (Magliocca, 2007;Reitzig et al, 2007;Reitzig et al, 2010).…”

Section: The Consequences Of Bad Fencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patents and Open Innovation: Bad Fences Do Not Make Good Neighbors

Pénin¹,

Neicu²

2018

Journal of Innovation Economics &Amp; Management

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“…Sharks also generated outrage by targeting farmers and other end users of patented items. See Hayter (1942 and1947) and Magliocca (2007). For an example of current hostility toward "trolls," listen to the podcast "When Patents Attack!"…”

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confidence: 99%