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Müller, Rudolf; Sadanand, Asha

doi:10.1023/a:1024268907844

Cited by 15 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…They found that in later rounds, their results confirmed a first mover advantage, which they called "virtual observability". Muller and Sadanand [21] have found that subjects often choose in accordance with "virtual observability," particularly for simple games. Brandts and Holt [24] and Rapoport [25] have also found order of play effects.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Ideal Reactive Equilibrium

Sadanand

2019

Games

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Refinements of the Nash equilibrium have followed the strategy of extending the idea of subgame perfection to incomplete information games. This has been achieved by appropriately restricting beliefs at unreached information sets. Each new refinement gives stricter and more mathematically-complicated limitations on permitted beliefs. A simpler approach is taken here, where the whole idea of beliefs is dispensed with, and a new equilibrium concept, called the ideal reactive equilibrium, that builds on some pioneering work by Amershi, Sadanand and Sadanand on thought process dynamics, is developed.

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confidence: 99%

“…There are many other authors that have experimental results where they use other games (such as weak link games or resource dilemma games) and find that order of play does matter, such as Camerer, Knez and Weber[15], Budescu, Suleiman and Rapoport[19], Guth, Huck and Rapoport[20], and Muller and Sadanand[21] …”

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confidence: 99%

Ideal Reactive Equilibrium

Sadanand

2019

Games

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“…There is also an equilibrium in mixed strategies where each player chooses 2 with probability 10/13 and 3 with probability 3/13, in which each player has an expected payoff of 166/13.9 Blume & Gneezy (2010),Brandts et al (2007),Brandts & Holt (1995),Cachon & Camerer (1996),Cooper et al (1992Cooper et al ( , 1993,Huck & Müller (2005),Muller & Sadanand (2003),Shahriar (2014),Evdokimov & Rustichini (2014).…”

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confidence: 99%

Thanks But No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict

et al. 2014

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Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk

Hammond

2008

Studies in Choice and Welfare

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Von Neumann (1928) not only introduced a fairly general version of the extensive form game concept. He also hypothesized that only the normal form was relevant to rational play. Yet even in Battle of the Sexes, this hypothesis seems contradicted by players' actual behaviour in experiments. Here a refined Nash equilibrium is proposed for games where one player moves first, and the only other player moves second without knowing the first move. The refinement relies on a tacit understanding of the only credible and straightforward perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a corresponding game allowing a predictable direct form of cheap talk.

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Cited by 15 publications

References 11 publications

Ideal Reactive Equilibrium

Ideal Reactive Equilibrium

Thanks But No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict

Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk

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