BITs and bargains: Strategic aspects of bilateral and multilateral regulation of foreign investment

Bubb, Ryan; Rose‐Ackerman, Susan

doi:10.1016/j.irle.2007.07.005

Cited by 65 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Hence, the coverage of BITs may continue to increase. Depending on the relative benefits of staying out or opting into the BITs regime, an equilibrium can occur either with all developing countries choosing to adopt BITs or at an intermediate level of coverage where the increase in the volume of investment is just balanced by the fall in share of gains going to host states (Guzmán 1998;Bubb and Rose-Ackerman 2007).…”

Section: The Global Bits Regimementioning

confidence: 99%

When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties

2010

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Section: The Global Bits Regimementioning

confidence: 99%

When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties

2010

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“…These contract-based arbitration agreements often reference the very same arbitral facilities named in BITs (e.g., the ICC or ICSID), and they, as well as any resulting arbitral awards, are just as enforceable against host states as are BIT-based arbitrations and awards. Bubb and Rose-Ackerman (2007) and Guzman (1998) claim that in the absence of BITs, investment contracts are not legally binding upon host states as a matter of international law. This is simply mistaken.…”

Section: Legal Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?

Yackee

2008

Law Soc Rev

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A long line of research, beginning with Macaulay's (1963) well‐known study of “Non‐Contractual Relations in Business,” suggests that the formal trappings of domestic law often have effects on private behavior that are, at best, “indirect, subtle, and ambiguous” (Macaulay 1984:155). Law and society scholars have spent somewhat less time exploring whether international law's effects on behavior are similarly attenuated. In this article I examine whether foreign investors take the presence of strong formal international legal protections into account when deciding where to invest. I focus on whether the presence of bilateral investment treaties, or BITs, meaningfully influences investment decisions. I present results from a statistical analysis that examines whether the formally strongest BITs—those that guarantee investors access to international arbitration to enforce investors' international legal rights—are associated with greater investment flows. I find no clear link between treaty protections and investment, a finding consistent with past law and society research but in tension with claims common in the BIT literature that the treaties should have dramatic effects on investor behavior.

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“…For example, Bilateral Investment Treaties impose externalities on other states through their effect on foreign investment flows, and recipients of foreign investment may face a prisoner's dilemma in choosing whether to agree to BITs with source countries. See Guzman (1998) and Bubb & Rose-Ackerman (2007 We now have the following result:…”

Section: Potential Reforms To the International Refugee Protection Symentioning

confidence: 69%

The Economics of International Refugee Law

Bubb

Kremer

Levine

2011

The Journal of Legal Studies

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We model the current system of refugee protection as a contract that bound states to provide a more efficient level of the public good of refugee protection. We show how the screening problem caused by economic migration has strengthened states' incentives to shade on their obligations under the 1951 Convention, resulting in more refoulement of refugees to their place of persecution. We also model reform schemes in which wealthy states pay poorer states to host refugees. A system that transfers refugee claimants from wealthy states to poorer states could ameliorate the screening problem by inducing self-selection among refugee claimants but would also create negative externalities for third countries. We argue that reforms in which wealthy states paid poorer states to resettle refugees from other poorer states would be more efficient than current refugee policies that focus on providing aid in refugee camps and resettling refugees from camps to wealthy states.

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BITs and bargains: Strategic aspects of bilateral and multilateral regulation of foreign investment

Cited by 65 publications

References 6 publications

When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties

When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties

Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?

The Economics of International Refugee Law

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