Biosafety and biosecurity in Synthetic Biology: A review

Abstract

Synthetic Biology is a growing field which holds great promise in several areas of application. However, it also poses serious risks for human health and the environment that must be anticipated in order to develop effective prevention and management measures. Here, the current situation on biosafety and biosecurity in this scientific field is reviewed. Biosafety concerns mainly relate to the damaging effects for workers and the environment that could result from accidental interactions with dangerous biological agents. On the other hand, biosecurity risks refer to the potential misuses of Synthetic Biology, such as bioterrorism, biowarfare or bioattacks that could derive from the genetic engineering of organisms. In this paper, the specific challenges posed by Synthetic Biology are discussed, and perspectives in the development of measures to guide the safe advance of this discipline are presented.

Unconventional settings and uses of human enhancement technologies: A non‐systematic review of public and experts' views on self‐enhancement and DIY biology/biohacking risks

“…Overall, the benefit assessment of scientists builds on arguments associated with the multiple broader movements, while the risk assessment of scientists is mostly derived from one movement, synthetic biology movement. According to Gómez‐Tatay & Hernández‐Andreu (, p. 26), synthetic biology has three main risk branches: “protocells, xenobiology, and DIYsynbio.”…”

“…The dual‐use view is often adopted when discussing the promises and risks of the DIYBM. On a fundamental level, the DIYBM is a risk because it increases the dual‐use risk and the risk for unintended negative consequences since it increases the probability of accidents by practitioners with no biosafety training “manipulating organisms in their homes” and possibly pursuing “reckless projects” (Gómez‐Tatay & Hernández‐Andreu, , p. 26) without “regulatory devices such as professional codes, export controls, or classification” (Evans, , p. 272). However, Jefferson, Lentzos, and Marris () argue that current advances in DNA synthesis are far from enabling the DIYBM to be a real risk for biosecurity.…”

“…From the positive perspective, scientists emphasize the potential of the DIYBM to facilitate a more innovative, transparent, and collaborative way of doing science and sharing knowledge by promoting citizen science and decentralized, affordable access to biotechnology (Gómez‐Tatay & Hernández‐Andreu, ).…”

Future trends in synthetic biology in Asia

“…183 Experts are calling for more regional and even global harmonization and collaborations. 177,178,184 For instance, in the face of a novel pathogen, coordinated real-time communication and data sharing across borders will make biosecurity surveillance and response more effective. 184 In order to achieve this, it is important to have researchers and regulators from different countries align their understanding of the benefits and risks of synthetic biology, and lay out common frameworks for synthetic biology regulations and biosecurity surveillance.…”

A Graph-Directed Approach for Creation of a Homology Modeling Library: Application to Venom Structure Prediction

“…The high-throughput evaluation of toxin mode of action as well as the diagnosis and decontamination of disulfide rich toxins, either natural or man-made, is required for public health safety. Rapid advances in synthetic biology have created challenges in determining the health risks posed by natural toxins or modified toxins with even higher pathogenicity [Gomez-Tatay and Hernandez-Andreu, 2019]. Thus, in tandem with high-throughput screening for therapeutic design, it is necessary to also be able to perform high-throughput screening for threat identification and determination of toxin targets and mechanisms of action.…”