Kant's Theory of Biology 2014
DOI: 10.1515/9783110225792.131
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Biological Purposiveness and Analogical Reflection

Abstract: In the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment", Kant claims that in the realm of living nature we encounter phenomena that appear to display a peculiar purposiveness. The wings of a bird, for example, seem to be conducive to the bird's capacity to fly and thereby to the survival of the bird as a whole. The whole organism, moreover, appears to be the result of an end-directed developmental process. Some natural objects, namely the living organisms, thus appear to us as if they were characterized by a p… Show more

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Cited by 43 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…At the same time, he warned against an anthropomorphism that comes with taking this as the literal, ultimate truth about the natural world. He wrote in the Critique of the Power of Judgment that, "we picture to ourselves the possibility of the [biological] object on the analogy of a causality of this kind-a causality such as we experience in ourselves-and so regard nature as possessed of a capacity of its own for acting technically" (Kant, 1790/1952Breitenbach, 2014). But as Illetterati (2014, p. 91) explains, "these kinds of notions, even if necessary, seem to maintain a sort of fictional character too: indeed, they have no justification in things themselves, but neither do they have their origin in mere human invention.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At the same time, he warned against an anthropomorphism that comes with taking this as the literal, ultimate truth about the natural world. He wrote in the Critique of the Power of Judgment that, "we picture to ourselves the possibility of the [biological] object on the analogy of a causality of this kind-a causality such as we experience in ourselves-and so regard nature as possessed of a capacity of its own for acting technically" (Kant, 1790/1952Breitenbach, 2014). But as Illetterati (2014, p. 91) explains, "these kinds of notions, even if necessary, seem to maintain a sort of fictional character too: indeed, they have no justification in things themselves, but neither do they have their origin in mere human invention.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the inexplicability of Naturzweck,s ee Kreines (2005,2 84-288).  Forr ecent accounts of this analogy,s ee Illetterati (2014, 91-95); Breitenbach (2014).  By contrast,the teleological antinomyisnot aconflict between constitutive principles of the power of judgment in its determininguse and thus does not concern objective propositions regarding the possibilityo fo bjectso ra ctual features of objects.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 6. Analogical reasoning and teleological judgment are closely related. See Breitenbach (2014), Van Den Berg (2018: 67–76), and Bennington (2017). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%