Biological and cognitive mechanisms and the role of culture in theory of mind development: In need of an integrative, biocultural perspective?

Abstract

The present paper attempts a comprehensive approach to the biological, cognitive, as well as cultural foundations of theory of mind development. A critical analysis and synthesis of contemporary research findings serves as a basis for revisiting key theoretical accounts regarding the nature and development of this valuable sociocognitive faculty. Are the findings best interpreted within frameworks which consider developmental change and individual differences in the domain-general cognitive abilities (executive functions) that may underlie performance on theory of mind tasks (processing account)? Or is it more fruitful to discuss the development of theory of mind based on domain-specific mechanisms or capacities: an innate, modular mechanism that is underpinned by neurological maturation (modularity theories), or an inborn capacity to form naïve, intuitive theories about the mind, which are then subject to conceptual change as a function of experience (theory theory account), or a mechanism that serves simulations of mental states and related attributions (simulation theories)? Where possible, biological and neurocognitive processes, and experiential influences are discussed in combination. A disentanglement of general cultural influences from more proximal, social or familial effects on theory of mind development is also attempted. The aim is to highlight the value of an integrative, interdisciplinary approach to its study: a biocultural perspective could essentially serve this purpose by shifting attention to the interplay of biological, cognitive, and environmental forces shaping the lifespan dynamics of human theory of mind.