“…These schemes differ in rationale and implementation, but in essence attempt to create supply and demand for environmental goods (Lapeyre et al . ). Worldwide, forest conservation has often been the focus of such schemes, commonly based on Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…The historical depletion of the natural environment (Gibbons et al 2016) has led to the emergence of a wide variety of market-based conservation instruments. These schemes differ in rationale and implementation, but in essence attempt to create supply and demand for environmental goods (Lapeyre et al 2015). Worldwide, forest conservation has often been the focus of such schemes, commonly based on Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES).…”
A major challenge to reduce forest loss in the tropics is to incentivize conservation on private land in agricultural settings. Engaging private landowners in conservation schemes is particularly important along deforestation frontiers, such as in the southern Brazilian Amazon. While we know much about what motivates landowners to participate as providers, or sellers, of conservation schemes, understanding what motivates landowners who act as buyers, that is, those who require land to meet conservation obligations, remains lacking. Here we identify viewpoints of sellers and buyers of an emerging forest certificate trading scheme in Brazil and quantify the compatibility of their views to examine potential barriers to trade. Sellers and buyers could be divided into three groups, but only one group in each case was positive about participating in the scheme. A key concern of buyers was the desire for establishing contracts with a long duration; in contrast, price was a key issue for sellers. Addressing these concerns by defining minimum contract lengths and restricting the spatial scale of transactions will be essential if this scheme is to realise its potential to reduce rates of deforestation.
“…These schemes differ in rationale and implementation, but in essence attempt to create supply and demand for environmental goods (Lapeyre et al . ). Worldwide, forest conservation has often been the focus of such schemes, commonly based on Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…The historical depletion of the natural environment (Gibbons et al 2016) has led to the emergence of a wide variety of market-based conservation instruments. These schemes differ in rationale and implementation, but in essence attempt to create supply and demand for environmental goods (Lapeyre et al 2015). Worldwide, forest conservation has often been the focus of such schemes, commonly based on Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES).…”
A major challenge to reduce forest loss in the tropics is to incentivize conservation on private land in agricultural settings. Engaging private landowners in conservation schemes is particularly important along deforestation frontiers, such as in the southern Brazilian Amazon. While we know much about what motivates landowners to participate as providers, or sellers, of conservation schemes, understanding what motivates landowners who act as buyers, that is, those who require land to meet conservation obligations, remains lacking. Here we identify viewpoints of sellers and buyers of an emerging forest certificate trading scheme in Brazil and quantify the compatibility of their views to examine potential barriers to trade. Sellers and buyers could be divided into three groups, but only one group in each case was positive about participating in the scheme. A key concern of buyers was the desire for establishing contracts with a long duration; in contrast, price was a key issue for sellers. Addressing these concerns by defining minimum contract lengths and restricting the spatial scale of transactions will be essential if this scheme is to realise its potential to reduce rates of deforestation.
“…Mechanisms and schemes of biodiversity offsetting are a common subject to research (see e.g., References [8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22]). Apart from positive experiences, evaluations document a variety of shortcomings, e.g., in terms of ecological effectiveness [23][24][25][26][27][28][29], monitoring and long-term management [10,24,26,30], functional appropriateness [31], acceptance and implications for farmers [32][33][34][35][36], availability of land [26,37], or the concept and implementation in general [38][39][40][41][42][43].…”
Environmental offset schemes designed to compensate for adverse development impacts are found in countries worldwide, pursuing no-net-loss policy. In Germany, a practice combining environmental improvements with farming evolved in the early 2000s, known as production-integrated compensation (PIC) (Produktionsintegrierte Kompensation). This paper provides a review of PIC, presenting origins, legal and cost aspects, as well as examples of PIC practice. PIC key challenges are the complexity of environmental improvements of agrarian habitats and the high efforts for communication among diverse actors and for designing and monitoring PIC. Benefits for nature conservation lie in the protection of strongly endangered species and an increase of acceptance of compensation measures. Positive effects for farmers are the sustaining of arable farmland and involvement in setting up land management terms. Investors profit from the increased availability of sites. However, a specific legal framework for PIC is still developing and representation of PIC in offset registries in the German States is only very small. In conclusion, targeted design, continuous monitoring, and long-term financing provided, PIC may (a) increase offset efficiency by focusing on implementation while avoiding land purchase and physical investments and (b) increase offset effectiveness by high conservation benefits and a collaborative approach towards farmers.
“…The increasing reliance on restoration measures in earlier stages of the decision-making process could create the impression that such actions amount to a "licence to trash" (Reid 2011, ten Kate and Pilgrim 2014, Lapeyre et al 2015, whereas the destruction of the EU's most valuable and threatened habitats should, as a matter of principle, be avoided from the very outset (van Teeffelen et al 2014). It should only be allowed whenever the public interests related to the infrastructure project clearly outweigh the ecological importance of the preservation of the Natura 2000 site.…”
Section: Mitigation Hierarchy: Restoration Actions As a Last Resort Omentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The concept of compensation for ecological damage or biodiversity offsetting has risen to the fore as one of the most prominent policy approaches to ensure that development with adverse ecological impacts does not lead to a net loss of nature conservation interests (Calvet et al 2015, Lapeyre et al 2015. The Business and Biodiversity Programme (BBOP) of the IUCN now defines biodiversity offsets as "measurable conservation outcomes resulting from actions designed to compensate for significant residual adverse biodiversity impacts arising from project development after appropriate prevention and mitigation measures have been taken" (BBOP 2012:13).…”
ABSTRACT. Biodiversity offsets have emerged as one of the most prominent policy approaches to align economic development with nature protection across many jurisdictions, including the European Union. Given the increased level of scrutiny that needs to be applied when authorizing economic developments near protected Natura 2000 sites, the incorporation of onsite biodiversity offsets in project design has grown increasingly popular in some member states, such as the Netherlands and Belgium. Under this approach, the negative effects of developments are outbalanced by restoration programs that are functionally linked to the infrastructure projects. However, although taking into consideration that the positive effects of onsite restoration measures leads to more leeway for harmful project development, the EU Court of Justice has recently dismissed the latter approaches for going against the preventative underpinnings of the EU Habitats Directive. Also, the expected beneficial outcomes of the restoration efforts are uncertain and thus cannot be relied upon in an ecological assessment under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. Although biodiversity offsets can still be relied upon whenever application is being made of the derogation clause under Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive, they cannot be used as mitigation under the generic decision-making process for plans and programs liable to adversely affect Natura 2000 sites. We outline the main arguments pro and contra the stance of the EU Court of Justice with regards to the exact delineation between mitigation and compensation. The analysis is also framed in the ongoing debate on the effectiveness of the EU nature directives. Although ostensibly rigid, it is argued that the recent case-law developments are in line with the main principles underpinning biodiversity offsetting. Opening the door for biodiversity offsetting under the Habitats Directive will certainly not reverse the predicament of the EU's biodiversity. A reinforcement of the preventative approach is instrumental to avert a further biodiversity loss within the European Union, even if it will lead to additional permit refusals for unsustainable project developments.
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