Biodefense R&amp;D: Anticipating Future Threats, Establishing a Strategic Environment

Smith, Bradley T.; Inglesby, Thomas V.; O’Toole, Tara

doi:10.1089/153871303769201842

Cited by 25 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…However, biodefense funding is only a very small portion of total research and development set asides within both health and human services and the DoD [19], although steady and significant funding is critical for discovery and development of MCM for biodefense indications. Clear and consistent funding priorities and plans across government agencies would assist small biotechnology companies with determining areas of interest.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Overall, investors do not seem very interested in funding biotechnology companies, much less funding biodefense initiatives in small companies that have questionable to no return [19]. Return on investment in the biodefense arena is based on stockpile requirements determined by the government threat assessments, or biological attacks and EID outbreaks that cannot be anticipated.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Role of small biotechnology companies in the fledgling biodefense vaccine industry

Warfield

Aman

2016

Expert Review of Vaccines

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Role of small biotechnology companies in the fledgling biodefense vaccine industry

Warfield

Aman

2016

Expert Review of Vaccines

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“…48,49 Contracts could specify a lower cost for countermeasure procurement in return for the government's taking on the costs of development risks. Promising leads from basic science could be funded to the point of IND filing and could be further developed later if the need arises-a process known as "strategic mothballing."…”

Section: Direct Involvementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anthrax Countermeasures: Current Status and Future Needs

Borio

Grönvall

2005

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, an

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The U.S. government does not yet have the range of medical countermeasures needed to protect its citizens from anthrax and other potential bioweapons. In the event of an anthrax attack, treatment interventions in addition to antibiotics would be needed so that very ill patients can be treated and clean-up crews can be better protected, especially if an engineered strain is used. This article describes specific anthrax countermeasures that are in development, barriers to development, and potential mechanisms the government could use to accelerate the movement of these countermeasures through the pipeline. A key challenge will be to encourage the transition of promising leads from basic research to the product development stage, when they may qualify for BioShield funds.

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“…Scientific understanding of living systems and how to manipulate them has been expanding exponentially, fuelled by advances in computerization, the global dispersion of scientific expertise as well as biological databases, and substantial economic investment in biomedical and agricultural research and product development. There are 30 different bacteria, viruses, and fungi on the NATO list of biological weapons threats, and there are additional agents on other lists (Smith et al 2003). With sufficient effort many of these could probably be modified so as to evade existing vaccines and antibiotics.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biowarfare as a biopolitical icon

Mordini

2005

Poiesis Prax

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Nuclear warfare threat has been one of the main driver for cultural, political, economical and social changes in the late twentieth century, biological warfare threat is about to take it over. However, while nuclear warfare was a concrete possibility, biological warfare is just an elusive risk. This paper will explore some reasons for this apparent inconsistency by discussing biowarfare from a symbolic point of view, looking for its inner meanings and philosophical implications.Zusammenfassung Der drohende Atomkrieg war eine der Hauptantriebe kulturellen, politischen, wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Wandels im spa¨ten 20. Jahrhundert. Jetzt ist die Gefahr biologischer Kriege im Begriff, diese Rolle zu u¨bernehmen. Wa¨hrend der Atomkrieg jedoch eine konkrete Mo¨glichkeit war, ist der Biokrieg nur ein kaum greifbares Risiko. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir einige der Gru¨nde fu¨r diesen offenbaren Widersinn, indem wir biologische Kriegfu¨hrung von einem symbolischen Standpunkt aus diskutieren und nach ihren inneren Bedeutungen und philosophischen Implikationen suchen.Re´sume´La menace de guerre atomique a e´te´l'un des moteurs principaux des changements culturels, politiques, e´conomiques et sociaux dans la deuxie`me moitie´du XX e sie`cle, la menace de guerre biologique est en passe de reprendre ce roˆle. Toutefois, tandis que la guerre nucle´aire e´tait une possibilite´concre`te, la guerre biologique est un risque peu tangible. Le pre´sent article explore les raisons de la contradiction apparente qui nous fait conside´rer la guerre biologique d'un point de vue symbolique et rechercher ses significations inte´rieures et ses implications philosophiques.

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Biodefense R&D: Anticipating Future Threats, Establishing a Strategic Environment

Cited by 25 publications

References 24 publications

Role of small biotechnology companies in the fledgling biodefense vaccine industry

Role of small biotechnology companies in the fledgling biodefense vaccine industry

Anthrax Countermeasures: Current Status and Future Needs

Biowarfare as a biopolitical icon

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