Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS: The United States, Japan and the European Communities in Comparative Perspective

Matthews, Duncan; Munoz-Tellez, V.

doi:10.1111/j.1422-2213.2006.00305.x

Cited by 35 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Both the UN Conference on Trade and Commerce (UNCTAD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have published their own interpretation of international patent law, whereby the latter has chosen to co-edit its publication with the WHO (WHO-WTO 2002;UNCTAD 2005). WIPO, the WTO and UNCTAD engage in independent or cooperative technical assistance programmes, through which they promote their respective perspectives on appropriate patent regulations (Matthews and Munoz-Tellez 2006). Quite often, they chose an integrated approach by which human resources development (for example training courses, written and online manuals) is attached to the provision of technical equipment (computer equipment, software and so on).…”

Section: Thomas R Eimer and Verena Schürenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Convenient Stalemates: Why International Patent Law Negotiations Continue Despite Deadlock

Eimer

Schüren²

2013

New Political Economy

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For almost 30 years, industrialised, emerging and developing countries negotiate on a substantive patent law harmonisation under the umbrella of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Although a common approach or at least some vague outlines of common ground seem beyond reach, all participants regularly agree on a continuation of the discussion process. Despite an incessant wheeling and dealing among delegates and WIPO officials, the only effect is that discussions still keep going on. In our paper, we draw on a synthesis of both neo-mercantilist and liberal institutionalist insights in order to explain the vibrant stalemate of substantive patent law harmonisation talks. We argue that WIPO's involvement in the negotiation process offers an incentive structure for states to continue negotiations even when a successful conclusion appears rather improbable or downright undesirable. WIPO officials do not necessarily oppose the alternative deployment of their resources and services, because national negotiators' tactics at least partially coincide with their own interests. The paper concludes with a summary of the major results and a discussion on their potential empirical and theoretical relevance for further studies.

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Section: Thomas R Eimer and Verena Schürenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Convenient Stalemates: Why International Patent Law Negotiations Continue Despite Deadlock

Eimer

Schüren²

2013

New Political Economy

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“…Thus, international organizations might play a role in the diffusion of regulatory data protection. In fact, technical assistance has been specifically identified as facilitating the spread of stronger intellectual property laws (Matthews and Munoz‐Tellez, ).…”

Section: Mechanisms Of Diffusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International Coercion and the Diffusion of Regulatory Data Protection

Michael¹

2016

World Intellectual Property

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Prior to 1990, regulatory data protection existed only in 14 highly developed countries. Since then, 60 additional countries have adopted regulatory data protection. New adopters include a large number of countries with no domestic pharmaceutical industry. These countries will face higher pharmaceutical prices as a result of offering regulatory data protection. Why would countries that stand to lose from offering regulatory data protection choose to do so? The author argues that the global diffusion of regulatory data protection can be directly traced to international coercion from the United States and the European Union (EU). The US coerces weaker trading partners into adopting regulatory data protection by requiring such protection as a condition of concluding trade agreements or bilateral intellectual property agreements. Meanwhile, the EU coerces applicants by demanding that they adopt such rights during EU accession negotiations, on average four years prior to accession. He tested these claims using a multi-method research design that combines event history analysis with evidence from leaked US diplomatic cables and public EU accession documents. His findings demonstrate that coercive diffusion can take place by means of threats, and that countries often actively oppose adopting intellectual property rights, but nevertheless adopt them due to international coercion.

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“…Drahos's (2010) analysis of patent offices in the developing world considers the role of technical assistance as a source of socialization. May (2004) and Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006) also examine the role of technical assistance in shaping national policies. Matthews's (2011) analysis of IP policy-making in Brazil, India, and South Africa focuses on the role of non-governmental actors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Intellectual Property, Access to Medicines, and Health: New Research Horizons

Chorev

Shadlen

2015

St Comp Int Dev

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In this introduction we briefly review the literature on intellectual property rights and access to medicines, identifying two distinct generations of research. The first generation analyzes the origins of new intellectual property rules, in particular the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the significance of TRIPS to developing countries. The second generation examines national-level experiences, as countries adjust their laws and practices to conform to TRIPS.Based on the insights provided by the articles in the special issue, we contribute to the second generation by considering a pair of overarching sets of issues. First, we highlight the domestic political challenges that affect how countries go about implementing their new obligations under TRIPS. We argue that alliances and coalitions are necessary to underpin the use of policy instruments designed to conform to TRIPS while taking into account local conditions and needs, , and we present insights that allow us to understand why alliances and coalitions are difficult to construct and sustain in this area. Second, we explain why policies that many countries adopt in response to TRIPS often do not generate their desired or intended outcomes. In the last section of the introduction we review the articles that appear in this special issue.

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Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS: The United States, Japan and the European Communities in Comparative Perspective

Cited by 35 publications

References 2 publications

Convenient Stalemates: Why International Patent Law Negotiations Continue Despite Deadlock

Convenient Stalemates: Why International Patent Law Negotiations Continue Despite Deadlock

International Coercion and the Diffusion of Regulatory Data Protection

Intellectual Property, Access to Medicines, and Health: New Research Horizons

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