Bidding for nothing? The pitfalls of overly neutral framing

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. Neutral framing is a standard tool of experimental economics. However, overly neutral instructions, which lack any contextual clues, can lead to strange behavior. In a contextless second price auction for a meaningless good, a majority of subjects enter positive bids-a case of cognitive experimenter demand effect. Subjects bid positive amounts because this is what they think they are tasked with in the experiment. Adding a second auction that has a context drastically reduces the positive bids in the meaningless first auction by reducing the cognitive experimenter demand effect. Terms of use: Documents in

The Effects of Income Windfalls on Labor Supply and Tax Compliance: Experimental Evidence

“…We note that it may be impossible to completely rule out experimenter demand effects, even with neutral framing, as documented byDürsch and Müller (2017).…”

Satisficing or maximizing in public–private partnerships? A laboratory experiment on strategic bargaining

“…After an introduction into the aim and structure of the experiment, participants received written information on the scenario of the game, contextualizing it as a large-scale urban infrastructure project PPP with shared operational risks between one public and one private sector partner. Following Hodge's (2004) PPP risk taxonomy and Hart and Moore's (2008) contract-as-reference-point theory, the scenario stressed that the contractual agreement between partners was to share both profits and losses equally to set an explicit default for negotiation strategies and to increase the validity of findings through increased perceived realism (Duersch and Müller 2017). Participants were then randomly framed into either the role of a senior civil servant or a senior private sector employee with equal negotiation discretion and space (treatment).…”