1985
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405x(85)90044-3
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders

Abstract: The presence of traders with superior information leads to a positive bid-ask spread even when the specialist is risk-neutral and makes zero expected profits. The resulting transaction prices convey information, and the expectation of the average spread squared times volume is bounded by a number that is independent of insider activity. The serial correlation of transaction price differences is a function of the proportion of the spread due to adverse selection. A bid-ask spread implies a divergence between ob… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

107
3,005
9
35

Year Published

1998
1998
2012
2012

Publication Types

Select...
9

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 5,068 publications
(3,247 citation statements)
references
References 18 publications
107
3,005
9
35
Order By: Relevance
“…We find that order size and currency spreads are negatively correlated and commercial customers are faced with higher spreads than financial customers. This contrasts with to standard adverse selection theory, which suggests that dealers increase spreads with a rising likelihood of private information indicated by customer type or order size (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985;Easley and O'Hara, 1987). Moreover, our dealer refrains from quote shading, i.e.…”
Section: End-user Order Flow and Exchange Rate Dynamics 1 1 Introductioncontrasting
confidence: 69%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…We find that order size and currency spreads are negatively correlated and commercial customers are faced with higher spreads than financial customers. This contrasts with to standard adverse selection theory, which suggests that dealers increase spreads with a rising likelihood of private information indicated by customer type or order size (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985;Easley and O'Hara, 1987). Moreover, our dealer refrains from quote shading, i.e.…”
Section: End-user Order Flow and Exchange Rate Dynamics 1 1 Introductioncontrasting
confidence: 69%
“…The microstructure literature generally suggests that market making is performed under information asymmetry, implying that spreads should include an adverse-selection component that compensates dealers for losses to privately informed counterparties (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985;Kyle, 1985). Based on this literature, it is now commonly accepted that adverse selection costs are the primary channel through which asymmetric information affects spreads.…”
Section: Pricing Behavior Of An Fx Dealer In the Dollar-euro Marketmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The assumption of risk neutrality implies that the market maker utility does not vary with inventory, which is in contrast to the empirical observation indicating that FX dealers manage inventory intensively. Moreover, the batch clearing of orders does not allow for bid-ask spreads as they arise naturally in sequential trade models (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) or, more recently, in simultaneous-trade models like Lyons (1997). Since the focus of this paper is on investigating daily (or lower frequency) exchange rates before and after the introduction of a target zone, the simplifications made here seem to be reasonable.…”
Section: Market Maker's Pricing Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Transaction costs therefore represent a cash outflow that reduces future returns. Additionally, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) note that a primary cause of illiquidity in financial markets is the adverse selection, which arises from the presence of informed traders. If a marginal investor is uninformed, he may demand higher rates of return when the adverse selection problem is more severe.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%