2011
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-011-9177-0
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Biased voluntary disclosure

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Cited by 59 publications
(30 citation statements)
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“…Costly state falsification models. In contrast to mandatory disclosure settings, costly reporting distortions have largely been left unexplored in voluntary disclosure settings (with the exception of Korn, 2004;Beyer and Guttman, 2010;Einhorn and Ziv, 2010). 26 Costly state falsification models assume that while disclosures do not have to be truthful, reporting distortions are costly to managers.…”
Section: Non-verifiable Disclosurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Costly state falsification models. In contrast to mandatory disclosure settings, costly reporting distortions have largely been left unexplored in voluntary disclosure settings (with the exception of Korn, 2004;Beyer and Guttman, 2010;Einhorn and Ziv, 2010). 26 Costly state falsification models assume that while disclosures do not have to be truthful, reporting distortions are costly to managers.…”
Section: Non-verifiable Disclosurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The capital need theory suggests that more voluntary disclosure enables firms to obtain the funds they need at lower cost (Choi, 1973). In spite of the importance of voluntary disclosure, it is left to the management's discretion (Chen & Jaggi, 2000) and therefore, is influenced by their information-biased selection (Einhorn & Ziv, 2012). Management decides on the type and amount of voluntary information to be disclosed in the firm's annual report (Eng & Mak, 2003).…”
Section: Board Composition and Voluntary Disclosurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the …rm in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) always discloses, Korn (2004), Kwon, Newman, andZang (2009), andEinhorn andZiv (2012) study settings where a single …rm decides whether to disclose potentially biased information. In these settings, the …rm withholds su¢ ciently bad news and, conditional on disclosure, the market can perfectly back out any bias because it is informed about the …rm's incentives.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Because …rm values are drawn from a …nite interval, a partly separating equilibrium exists for some costs of misreporting where …rms with low …rm values do not disclose, …rms with intermediate values disclose biased reports, and …rms with high values disclose the upper threshold. Einhorn and Ziv (2012) allows for non-linear equilibria and shows that the amount of bias increases in the privately observed information.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%