Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: The role of emotion specificity.

Abstract

Positive and negative moods have been shown to increase likelihood estimates of future events matching these states in valence (e.g., E. J. Johnson & A. Tversky, 1983). In the present article, 4 studies provide evidence that this congruency bias (a) is not limited to valence but functions in an emotion-specific manner, (b) derives from the informational value of emotions, and (c) is not the inevitable outcome of likelihood assessment under heightened emotion. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrates that sadness and anger, 2 distinct, negative emotions, differentially bias likelihood estimates of sad and angering events. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding in addition to supporting an emotion-as-information (cf. N. Schwarz & G. L. Clore, 1983), as opposed to a memory-based, mediating process for the bias. Finally, Study 4 shows that when the source of the emotion is salient, a reversal of the bias can occur given greater cognitive effort aimed at accuracy. Affective states have been shown to influence many types of decisions that individuals regularly confront (for reviews, see Forgas, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Wegener & Petty, 1996). Among these is the assessment of the frequencies with which, or the likelihoods that, certain events will occur (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Mayer, Gaschke, Braverrnan, & Evans, 1992). Sometimes, the consequences of such judgments can be relatively minor, such as when trying to determine if the Yankees will trounce the Red Sox or if an admired coworker will accept an invitation for a date. Other times, however, the consequences can be quite profound, such as when considering the chances of developing lung cancer from smoking, the odds of contracting AIDS from practicing

Interactive Effects of Mood and Task Framing on Creative Generation

“…Here, participants in the no cue condition were administered essentially the same procedure as in Experiment 1, whereas those in the cue condition were inquired about their current mood state not only directly after the mood induction (as part of a manipulation check unobtrusively embedded within a set of filler items) but again, immediately before beginning the creative generation task (cf. DeSteno et al, 2000;Gasper, 2003). This blatant second mood probe was meant to remind individuals that their current affective states resulted from writing about their positive or negative life events earlier in the session, and had no bearing on the generation task at hand.…”

“…So, for instance, when participants in whom mood has been experimentally induced are cued as to the source of their moods when completing a subsequent task, they will no longer view their affective states as informative regarding how to complete the task at hand, and should attempt to prevent their moods from contaminating their responses (see e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The results of this correction process may be manifested in an outright elimination of mood effects (e.g., Hirt et al, 1997) or in their reversal (e.g., DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000). In the latter case, individuals overcorrect for the potential biasing influence of task-irrelevant affective states by deliberately responding in a manner that they believe represents the opposite of how they would have responded in the absence of correction (Wegener & Petty, 1997).…”

Risk taking under the influence: A fuzzy-trace theory of emotion in adolescence

“…Moreover, individuals reported an increase in approach behaviors, measured by behavioral intentions, for messages that matched their emotional state. In both sets of studies, the emotion induced was incidental to both the judgments and the persuasive messages (DeSteno et al, 2004;DeSteno et al, 2000). Even when irrelevant to a decision, discrete emotional states are likely to influence judgments and subsequent behavior (although only behavioral intentions were assessed in DeSteno et al, 2004).…”

Emotion: The self-regulatory sense

“…Indeed, as depicted in Figure 8, these complex feeling perceptions are the more long-term feed-forward causal components of behavior, 79 reflecting both conscious and habitual motives, judgments, and appraisals that still carry their original emotional valence as "emotion schemas" 290 in attitudes 310,311 ; moods, 312,313 and even personality traits. 314 In short, the complex feeling perceptions deliver self-regulatory information about the mind, feeding forward an ongoing stream of evaluative commentary about its optimal or dysfunctional holdings, habits, and the uses and abuses of the rational intellect.…”