Beyond the regulatory state: rethinking energy security governance and politics in the European Union

Abstract

The regulatory state model has traditionally been used to analyse the process of integrating the European energy sector, including the sensitive area of security of gas supply. This article argues that, due to recent innovations, this conceptualisation has become increasingly problematic and cannot provide an accurate picture of the current governance and politics of European energy security. This article applies the catalytic state model to the EU and contrasts it with the regulatory state approach. The catalytic state describes a peculiar pattern of governance which combines-rather than resolves-the tensions between market-centred and state-centred approaches and supranational and national views on EU energy security. This article also illustrates how this stylised form of state can be used to better frame the guiding principles, strategies and tools that are currently emerging as EU institutions address the issue of security of gas supply. Keywords Catalytic state • Energy diplomacy • EU energy security • Regulatory state • Security of gas supply * Andrea Prontera

Under pressure: A qualitative comparative analysis on the factors contributing to the success and failure of cross-border gas pipeline construction in Europe and Turkey

“…[10] highlighted that these countries also tend to favor individual relations with gas suppliers and organize infrastructure projects. Additionally, synergies between private companies and national governments' objectives strengthened pipeline success in the South Gas Corridor and other Italian pipelines, as governments are able to negotiate with other countries and EU institutions to obtain political support for a specific project [11,12]. [13] indicates the use of a government-to-government mechanism in the energy sector to promote projects.…”

“…In the past, the planned Galsi project was hampered by a misalignment between the objectives of the European Commission and Algeria [15]. [11] also addressed the EU's (the Commission) growing political, regulatory and financial support in the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and Nabucco projects, that might contribute to the successful completion of these projects [11]. In the case of Nord Stream 2, the Commission tried to prevent the completion of the project, but failed because of its limited competences in the external energy dimension [20].…”

“…In the appendix, the main characteristics of these 21 pipelines are introduced. The projects are all gas pipelines to the European and Turkish market and were found using different sources [3,8,11,30,31]. They do not include intra-European projects, for example pipelines between Poland and Lithuania, or Bulgaria and Greece.…”

“…The case of Nabucco highlighted that support from a producer is important, as the Nabucco consortium did not include a production company or country [6]. Additionally, the connected countries can provide support for companies headquartered on their territories through their diplomatic connections [11], this can increase the success rate of the pipeline. For this condition, we examine whether all involved states are supportive of the project.…”

“…Third, the role of the Commission is examined, based on studies by [11,15,20]. Specifically, the placement of cases on the Project of Common Interest (PCI) list and the EU funding are considered indicators of support.…”