Beyond the ‘failed state’: Toward conceptual alternatives

Abstract

The article advances conceptual alternatives to the ‘failed state.’ It provides reasons why the concept is deficient, showing especially how counterproductive it is to aggregate states as diverse as Colombia, Malawi, Somalia, Iraq, Haiti, and Tajikistan. I argue for distinguishing among capacity gaps, security gaps, and legitimacy gaps that states experience. Importantly, I show that these gaps often do not coincide in a given country, and that the logical responses to each of the three gaps diverge in significant ways. I offer brief case examples of the logic of response to the gaps and of the tensions that must be managed among them. The article advances the debate over an important and under-theorized emergent concept in global politics.

States of Fragility 2016

“…Statehood in turn is defined by effectiveness and legitimacy (Goldstone et al, 2000;Marshall and Cole, 2014;Rice and Patrick, 2008); a three-dimensional conception of state authority, state legitimacy and state capacity; or some variation on this theme (Carment, Samy and Landry, 2013;Call, 2010;Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, 2015). Empirical assessments of fragility tend to try to measure these dimensions of statehood based on domains such as political performance, economic performance and social performance.…”

Assessing Peace Operations' Mitigated Outcomes

“…This has the benefit of considering the accomplishment of the mandate based upon the particular conditions of peace operations in situations where a government has lost legitimacy and control over security in the state's territory. 15 In weighing the two dimensions it will be argued that the re-establishment of order is more important than the accomplishment of the mandate. Peace operations are deemed partial failures when they fail to re-establish order, yet succeed at accomplishing their mandates.…”

The limits to statebuilding for peace in Africa

“…Citizens of many post-conflict African countries, faced with exclusionary, authoritarian and violent governments, may look 92 D Curtis to external support for their causes, just as diverse elites also link up with external interlocutors and may try to manipulate or instrumentalise international engagement. 63 The idea of the state and the formal legalÁrational institutions that characterise ideal 'Western' states are reflected in the practices of many African state officials, and many claims vis-à-vis the state are expressed within formal and legal channels in Africa. Yet these often exist alongside other forms of governance and power, which are also deployed as sets of claims through which rulers legitimise their rule.…”