Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture

Abstract

The European Union and its member states have moved with considerable speed towards the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Whether what has been achieved so far adds up to a revolution remains a moot point. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Maastricht Treaty has not always been noted for its binding character, and too often the debate over security and defence has degenerated into an artificial, zero‐sum‐type game between Atlanticists and Europeanists. What is required for the success of the ESDP is not simply continued commitment to achieving the Headline Goals set out at Helsinki in 1999, but also the development of what the authors call a ‘strategic culture’, i.e. an institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the effective range of legitimate policy instruments of the Union. The authors argue that political commitment at the highest levels has been underpinned by the institutionalization, within the Council Secretariat, of the ‘military option’ in the form of the Military Committee and a Directorate General for the EU’s Military Staff (DGEUMS). Even more importantly, there are already signs, especially through such concepts as ‘security sector reform’ and ‘structural stability’, that the EU, through its development and humanitarian programmes, has already recognized the necessity of military solutions.

The framing of European foreign and security policy: towards a post-modern policy framework?

“…Despite the persistence of awkward questions about costs and about the framework within which such a force might be deployed, the move towards action in areas of 'hard security' seemed to have gained a good deal of momentum. By the end of 2001, the Laeken European Council declared the RRF to be 'operational', although it was clear that many of the commitments remained to be fleshed out and that the development of a surrounding strategic culture and doctrine remained open to question (Howorth 2000;Cornish and Edwards 2001;Deighton 2003).…”

Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms

“…While some authors argue that the differences among national strategic cultures in Europe are large and persistent (Rynning 2003, Lindley-French 2002, others point out dynamics, which may lead to a process of convergence towards a European strategic culture (Howorth 2002, Cornish andEdwards 2001). This debate has not been decided yet, because of a lack of direct empirical evidence about cultural change but also because of unresolved questions regarding the use of strategic culture in applied research.…”

Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism

“…Some hailed the achievement as marking a common European strategic culture, but others question whether the EU will ever be capable of forging a bond of common threat perceptions and interests. Optimists such as Cornish and Edwards (2001) contend that "there are signs that a European strategic culture is already developing through a socialization process." They define EU strategic culture as simply "the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments."…”

“…They define EU strategic culture as simply "the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments." [60] To Meyer (2004), the European Council vote on ESS in December 2003 provided a necessary "strategic concept" around which to focus attention and resources. [61] However, Lindley-French (2002) charges that Europe lacks both the capabilities and will to establish a common foreign and security policy in the foreseeable future.…”