Beyond the Demand-Input Model: A Theory of Representational Linkages

Abstract

We offer a theory of the direction and nature of representational linkages between constituents and their elected representatives based on two attributes of issues: their complexity and their relationship to the lines of partisan cleavage. We show that the theory is compatible with the existing evidence on representation and then offer results of tests of new predictions from the theory for both simple and complex party-defining issues. For additional evidence of the dyadic basis of these findings, we also show that the strength of the observed linkages varies in accordance with theoretical expectations about the seniority of members of Congress and, for senators, recency of election. We also explain how the theory can account for a number of seemingly contradictory empirical findings in the large literature on policy representation and how it allows scholars to make precise predictions about the characteristics of representational linkages.The study of policy representation enjoys a long research history in political science. The bulk of this research rests on a theory of representation that posits constituency opinion as an independent variable and representatives' attitudes and actions as dependent variables. We have learned a great deal about the relationships between masses and policy-making elites from research in this tradition (see, among many others, Cnudde and McCrone 1966;Kuklinski and Elling 1977;McCrone and Kuklinski 1979;Miller and Stokes 1963;Page et al. 1984). Yet, newer work on the subject raises doubts about the universal applicability of the static demand-input model of the representational process underlying such research by demonstrating that public opinion is not necessarily an exogenous and fixed force in the political system. Rather, public opinion itself can at times be influenced by events, elite political actors, or by public policy itself (see, among others, Cunningham andWe owe thanks to Scott Robinson for insightful comments that contributed to the development of our theoretical argument presented here, to Stephen Hanna and Carl Klarner for substantial assistance with the data collection and analysis for this paper, and to Gerald Wright, Jr., for a portion of the data used in the analysis. Other data were made available by the ICPSR, which bears no responsibility for the analysis or interpretations.

State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Practice of Electing Judges

“…An important research tradition examines linkages between political elites and masses. In its simplest form, these theories employ a demand-input model that commonly posits constituency as an exogenous independent variable and representatives' attitudes and actions as dependent variables (Hurley and Hill 2003). These studies illuminated notable relationships between masses and policymaking elites (see, e.g., Miller and Stokes 1963).…”

“…These studies illuminated notable relationships between masses and policymaking elites (see, e.g., Miller and Stokes 1963). However, later research presents a more complex picture, noting the importance of variations in issue characteristics and connections to party cleavages (Hurley and Hill 2003). When issues are complex, or when they are tied to party cleavages, public opinion may be influenced by political events, elites, or policy itself.…”

“…When issues are complex, or when they are tied to party cleavages, public opinion may be influenced by political events, elites, or policy itself. When issues are simple with opinions on them widely held, cutting across party cleavages, the standard demand-input model of one-way responsiveness is appropriate (Hurley and Hill 2003). The death penalty meets this standard as revealed below.…”

Dynamic Representation(s): Federal Criminal Justice Policy and an Alternative Dimension of Public Mood

“…A natural reaction to this theory of dynamic representation is to ask if politicians are responsive to public sentiment on an issue-by-issue basis. Studies of dyadic representation find heterogeneity in how public preferences are translated into policy across issues (Miller and Stokes 1963;Hurley and Hill 2003). It is not hard to imagine macro-level heterogeneity in policy responsiveness across issues.…”

Urban Decision Making and Police Salaries

“…Methodologically, then, policy output studies, including those involving salaries, are inherently at the aggregate level. Their unit of analysis is the governmental entity rather than the identifi cation of the factors that predict the decisions of individual policymakers (Hurley and Hill 2003;Kingdon 1977). The multitude of explanatory variables used in macrolevel output studies can be divided into several fundamental categories, including economic, demographic, and political.…”