Beyond possible worlds

Yagisawa, Takashi

doi:10.1007/bf00354640

Cited by 75 publications

(47 citation statements)

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“…17 I am ignoring other combinations that also satisfy plenitude-like {(Tab & Bb) and (Tab & ¬Bb)}-because, for obvious reasons, we are interested not only in combinations without repetition but also in combinations that contain exactly one world-possibility for each world. 18 This should alleviate some (not all) of the worries in Skyrms (1976) and Yagisawa (1988).…”

Section: Pluralities Versus Possibilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing

Roca-Royes

2018

Synthese

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Section: Pluralities Versus Possibilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing

Roca-Royes

2018

Synthese

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“…4 Similarly as in the case of impossible objects, since sentences (1)-(6) are necessarily false, there are no possible worlds where they are true. In other words, one of the main claims of the advocates of impossible worlds is that, just as for every possibility there is a world which represents it, similarly, for every impossibility, there should be a world which represents this impossibility (Yagisawa 1988;Nolan 1997;Mares 1997).…”

Section: Work For Impossible Worldsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A well-known concretist account of impossible worlds is Extended Modal Realism (EMR), represented by Takashi Yagisawa (1988). EMR is based on Modal Realism and is probably the most controversial account of impossible worlds.…”

Section: Metaphysics Of Impossible Worldsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Limits of Hybrid Modal Realism

Sendłak

2014

Axiomathes

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The aim of this paper is to point out the limitations of Hybrid Modal Realism as a general theory of modalities, i.e. one that gives an analysis of possibilities as well as impossibilities. To do so we will firstly sketch the goals that theories of impossible worlds should achieve. Secondly we will briefly present the two most popular accounts of impossibilities-Extended Modal Realism and Extended Ersatzism. We will focus on the aspects of both theories which became the motivation for a hybrid view. In the last part of this paper we will analyze Francesco Berto's Hybrid Modal Realism and present reasons why this account is an insufficient tool for analyzing impossibilities.

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“…Lewis 1973 himself has admitted that his 'reasons [to accept (a)] are less than decisive' (25). Among the numerous critics of (a), see for instance : Yagisawa 1988, Zagzebski 1990, Read (1995, Mares 1997, Nolan 1997, Priest 1997and Goodman 2004. An important reason why philosophers question clause (a) is that although certain counterpossibles appear intuitively true, other counterpossibles appear intuitively false (cf.…”

Section: The Antirealist's Rejoinder and Brogaard And Salerno's Replymentioning

confidence: 99%

Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy

Moretti

2007

Philos Stud

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Brogaard and Salerno 2005 have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno's argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga 1982 andRea 2000. If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed in Brogaard and Salerno's proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof invalid. My conclusion is that no reductio of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided. Alethic antirealism and the conditional fallacy: the state of playGlobal alethic antirealists analyse the notion of truth in terms of the biconditionals instantiated by the following schema:(AR) (T[P] ↔ (Q(P) → R(P))).Where P is a placeholder for statements, T [P] means that it is true that P, Q(P) means that epistemic conditions are ideal (or sufficiently good) for determining whether P, R(P) means that it is rationally believed that P. Furthermore,  is the necessity operator, ↔ is the material biconditional and → is the counterfactual conditional. AR says that, necessarily, it is true that P if and only if, if 2 epistemic conditions were ideal (or sufficiently good) for determining whether P, it would rationally be believed that P.Brogaard and Salerno 2005 argue that antirealism resting on AR is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that, necessarily, epistemic conditions are ideal for determining whether some statement is true, which implies that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno's argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga 1982 and Rea 2000. 1 Precisely, both demonstrations are argued to be questionable because appealing to principles valid only in classical logic that the antirealist may reject in favour of intuitionistic principles (cf. Brogaard and Salerno 2005: 126 and 130).Additionally, Plantinga's original proof and an intuitionistically respectable reformulation of it are found to lack in generality (cf.: 124-126). For they can successfully apply only to Peircean versions of antirealism, which require a commitment to the existence of one single epistemic situation (e.g. "the end of inquiry") appropriate to establish the truth of any statements. Such positions are argued to be unattractive and implausible on their own (cf.: 128-129).By contrast, Brogaard and Salerno's novel argument against antirealism is quite general, as it targets both Peircean antirealism and non-Peircean antirealism, which allows statements to have individual truth conditions (cf.: 135-136). Brogaard and Salerno also emphasize that their proof relies on only '...

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Beyond possible worlds

Cited by 75 publications

References 0 publications

Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing

Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing

Limits of Hybrid Modal Realism

Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy

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