Beyond discrete biases: Functional and dysfunctional aspects of judgmental heuristics.

Hogarth, Robin M.

doi:10.1037/0033-2909.90.2.197

Cited by 588 publications

(296 citation statements)

References 121 publications

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“…T.Fiske, 1980;McArthur & Ginsberg, 1981) can be plausibly reinterpreted as the natural by-product of an adaptive tendency to attend primarily to what is most important (McArthur & Baron, 1983). The tendency to be insensitive to regression effects (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973;Nisbett & Borgida, 1975;Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971) may stem from the human observers' adaptive sensitivity to changes in the underlying process (Hogarth, 1981). The "illusion of control" (Langer, 1975) may be useful in preventing depression (cf.…”

Section: The Information Given and Beyondmentioning

confidence: 99%

Errors and mistakes: Evaluating the accuracy of social judgment.

Funder¹

1987

Psychological Bulletin

799

461

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research on "error" in social judgment has largely supplanted research that addresses accuracy issues more directly. Moreover, this research attracts a great deal of attention because of what many take to be its dismal implications for the accuracy of human social reasoning. These implications are illusory, however, because an error is not the same thing as a "mistake." An error is a judgment of an experimental stimulus that departs from a model of the judgment process. If this model is normative, then the error can be said to represent an incorrect judgment. A mistake, by contrast, is an incorrect judgment of a real-world stimulus and therefore more difficult to determine. Although errors can be highly informative about the process of judgment in general, they are not necessarily relevant to the content or accuracy of particular judgments, because errors in a laboratory may not be mistakes with respect to a broader, more realistic frame of reference and the processes that produce such errors might lead to correct decisions and adaptive outcomes in real life. Several examples are described in this article. Accuracy issues cannot be addressed by research that concentrates on demonstrating error in relation to artificial stimuli, but only by research that uses external, realistic criteria for accuracy. These criteria might include the degree to which judgments agree with each other and yield valid predictions of behavior. The accuracy of human social judgment is a topic of obvious interest and importance. It is only natural to wonder to what degree the judgments we make of the personalities of ourselves and others might be right or wrong, and to desire to improve our accuracy. Nonpsychologists are often surprised and disappointed, therefore, when they begin to take psychology courses and discover that the field has largely foresworn interest in the accuracy issue. The discipline's early, direct interest in accuracy (e.g., Estes, 1938; Taft, 1955; Vernon, 1933) was all but completely stifled some years ago by the publication of a series of methodological critiques by Cronbach (1955), Hastorf and Bender (1952), and others. As a result, according to one authoritative textbook: The accuracy issue has all but faded from view in recent years, at least for personality judgments. There is not much present interest in questions about whether people are accurate... . There is, in short, almost no concern with normative questions of accuracy. On the other hand, in recent years there has been a renewed interest in how, why, and in what circumstances people are inaccurate. (Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979, p. 224; see also Cook, 1984)' Specifically, the psychology of social judgment has been dominated in recent years by a flood of research on the subject of "error." Studies of error appear in the literature at a prodigious rate, are disproportionately likely to be cited (Christensen-Sza

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Section: The Information Given and Beyondmentioning

confidence: 99%

Errors and mistakes: Evaluating the accuracy of social judgment.

Funder¹

1987

Psychological Bulletin

799

461

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“…The distinction between judgment and choice can help to predict when ambivalence is unpleasant. Hogarth (1981) illustrates the difference between the judgment and choice by comparing them to taking aim and actually shooting. The judgment (taking aim) is non-committal, pulling the trigger however commits one to the judgment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the ambivalent attitude holder, having to commit to one alternative should be unpleasant because neither alternative is entirely satisfying and both are associated with uncertain outcomes. Similarly, Hogarth (1981) argues that the anticipation of commitment can already lead to feelings of conflict. We therefore expect ambivalence to be unpleasant due to the anticipation of uncertain outcomes of ones choice.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ambivalence and decisional conflict as a cause of psychological discomfort: Feeling tense before jumping off the fence

Harreveld

Rutjens

Rotteveel

et al. 2009

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

155

224

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“…Many report the results of first trials where subjects had little opportunity to learn (Hogarth 1981). In others, critical information is not available to the subjects.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%