Beyond Consensus: Law, Disagreement and Democracy

Izzo, Valerio Nitrato

doi:10.1007/s11196-011-9236-7

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 9 publications

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“…In this paper, I will raise some conceptual difficulties with positing a ‘will to consensus’ that is prior to, and supervenes on, the rational discussion of deliberators. An African democratic model ought to take the issue of pluralism and disagreement seriously (Bellamy, 2002; Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2006; Mouffe, 1996, 1999, 2000; Nitrato Izzo, 2012; Rescher, 1993), and this may require abandoning the pursuit of consensus in deliberations (Fuerstein, 2014; Mansbridge et al., 2010; Solomon, 2001, 2006). The phenomena of disagreements and conflicts on the one hand, and pluralism and diversity on the other hand, make the will to consensus inessential to deliberation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The will to consensus

Kwesi

2024

The Philosophical Forum

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In a democracy, when a group of deliberators have a set of differing (and contrary) views and beliefs about a particular policy or action, p, a recommended course of action is for them to pursue, and ultimately reach, a consensus on p. The pursuit of consensus allows deliberators to ‘reach over the aisle’ in accommodating dissenting views through rational dialogue until a consensual agreement is reached by all the deliberators. What fuels this pursuit of consensus is the ‘will to consensus’—a ‘frame of mind’ or a ‘disposition’ to resolve disagreements into a consensus. In this paper, I will raise some conceptual problems with positing a ‘will to consensus’ that is prior to, and supervenes on, the rational discussion of deliberators. Instead of a ‘will to consensus’, democratic theorists should be content with the minimal claim of a ‘will to dialogue’.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The will to consensus

Kwesi

2024

The Philosophical Forum

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Poetry as a Form of Dissent: John F. Kennedy, Amiri Baraka, and the Politics of Art in Rhetorical Democracy

Onge

Moore

2016

Rhetoric Review

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Fundamentos de la semiótica jurídica. Hacia una semiótica del Derecho penal

Vargas¹

2018

derpen

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Historiográficamente, el Derecho se caracteriza por el predominio de la hermenéutica y de la dogmática. Esta condición se manifiesta en una epistemología cuyo método ha enseñoreado el aspecto técnico del saber jurídico. Consecuencia de lo cual ha sido, como sucede con la mayor parte de las ciencias sociales y humanas, la discreta importancia que han terminado otorgando a la sociedad y al ser humano, a los cuales reducen en tanto legos, a nudos e impotentes destinatarios de las instituciones jurídicas. De esta forma, el Derecho ha sido capitalizado por los técnicos, quienes se han desembarazado de “los demás”, transfiriéndolos a la sociología jurídica, la cual sin embargo no ha tenido por empeño el desarrollo de la ciencia del Derecho. En contraste, la semiótica del Derecho, semiótica jurídica o semiótica de la justicia, reivindica al ser humano y a las sociedades, en tanto las restablece en su condición auténtica de comunidades de hablantes del Derecho que, a través de procesos comunicativos para los cuales usan los signos jurídicos, crean y transmiten su propio sentido de justicia.

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Beyond Consensus: Law, Disagreement and Democracy

Cited by 4 publications

References 9 publications

The will to consensus

The will to consensus

Poetry as a Form of Dissent: John F. Kennedy, Amiri Baraka, and the Politics of Art in Rhetorical Democracy

Fundamentos de la semiótica jurídica. Hacia una semiótica del Derecho penal

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