Beyond consensus: ideas and advocacy coalitions around cash transfer programs in Brazil and Mexico

Abstract

How do new social policies emerge? The literature on developed countries has put forth important assumptions about changes in welfare policies, particularly building on the work of Esping-Andersen. However, discussion of social protection policies in middle-income countries underscores that rising policy innovations derive mostly from exogenous dimensions (external ideas and factors). In examining Mexico's Oportunidades and Brazil's Bolsa Famıĺia, one main question is addressed: What causal mechanisms underlie the rise of policy innovations that are not derived from exogenous dimensions? This article proposes moving beyond the argument in which international influence versus domestic politics are in opposition, and it suggests instead to compare empirical cases in different contexts, specifically by exploring the process of endogenous institutional changes using the example of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs. By exploring recent theoretical contributions to institutional changes, the article identifies two critical aspects: (1) the rise of a dominant advocacy coalition favoring an ideology that promotes human capital as a key factor in the formation of national CCT programs in Brazil and Mexico; and (2) advocacy coalitions achieve similar results in terms of institutional changes in Brazil and Mexico, despite having different strategies and patterns of change. How do new social policies emerge? How can we explain the rise of policy models? The literature on developed countries has put forth important assumptions about changes in welfare policies by grouping social policies into distinct regimes or spheres of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001). However, changes to social protection policies in middleincome countries-particularly in Latin America over the last few decades-present a major challenge for welfare state researchers (Carnes et al. 2007). By making use of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1999) and recent theoretical contributions to institutional changes, this article allows for deeper understanding of

Pioneering anti-poverty policies in Brazil and Mexico: ambiguities and disagreements on conditional cash transfer programs

“…In order to grasp the mechanisms underlying changes in the CCTs that Brazil and Mexico pioneered, we must adopt a gradual institutional change view of their historical institutionalism, which in turn will allow us to correct for the dualist approach that separates periods of institutional stability and change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Palier, 2005 and Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Following this perspective, the origins and continuity of CCTs do not always reflect the objectives of specific actors, groups or coalitions, but are instead the result of coordination among actors with sometimes conflicting goals and often ambiguous commitments (Tomazini, 2019). In order to shed light on the continuous struggles that are faced when pioneering, formulating and adopting these anti-poverty policies, we analyze three types of ambiguities: axiological, partisan and electoral (see Table 1) [4].…”

“…The second Cardoso government (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002) witnessed a proliferation of federal CCTs, each with different conditionalities and managed by different ministries such as the Ministries of Education, of Health, of Mines and Energy, as well as some others. Small changes accumulated at the top and at the edges of existing assistance policies, which then contributed to major long-term changes to the rationale behind the old antipoverty programs (Tomazini, 2019).…”

Optics of the State: The Politics of Making Poverty Visible in Brazil and Mexico

“…By 2016, approximately 65 countries in the world had adopted CCTs, benefiting an estimated 1 billion individuals globally. It is commonly acknowledged, however, that Brazil and Mexico have the only two CCT programs to be considered locally rooted, in the sense that they were designed independently of each other and financed without the support of international organizations (Lindert et al 2007, Tomazini 2017. At the time of initial program implementation, therefore, these two countries did not have a blueprint for how to make CCTs work, so they had to "find the poor" by building on their previous experiences with poverty programs.…”

Extending Varieties of Capitalism to Emerging Economies: What can We Learn from Brazil?

“…The growth period of 2004 -2013 saw an increase in per capita GDP by 64% and a rise in the formal employment rate from 49.7% in 2003 to 71.4% in 2012 (Costa 2018: 4). Lula used state power to consolidate support amongst the poor and the working class through the institutionalisation of conditional cash transfers, such as the Bolsa família income support for the poor (Tomazini 2019), substantial increases in the minimum wage year on year (which also led to higher pensions since these were linked to the minimum wage) and thirdly the introduction of credit/bank loans for household purchases to those who had never before had bank accounts, with repayment automatically deducted from monthly wages or pensions. Lavinas (2017) charts the doubling of total wages from R$1.3tn to R$2.6tn between 2002 and 2014 and a more than three-fold rise in total credit from R$861bn to R$3tn.…”