Between patronage and good governance: Organizational arrangements in (local) public appointment processes

Abstract

This paper investigates whether certain organizational arrangements in (local) public appointment processes could encourage the use of appointments as a tool of good governance rather than as a tool of patronage. Specifically, we studied the role of six organizational arrangements in ten case studies of intra-and interorganizational public appointment processes held in Italian local government. We found that good governance (in terms of perception of overall integrity and fairness) was found in processes of public appointments where there was independent scrutiny, and when the process involved local councillors and/or external stakeholders-that is, actors beyond those with the formal power to appoint. In these cases, making appointments was seen as a tool of good governance rather than of patronage. These organizational arrangements were more relevant than other ones such as transparency of public advertisements, job descriptions and educational/professional requirements, media and public awareness. The paper describes the relevant literature, the research study and discusses implications for research, policy and management.

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