Between Intuition and Professionalism: Israeli Military Leadership during the 1948 Palestine War

Abstract

Despite its achievements in the 1948 Palestine War, the military performance of the Israeli army was less impressive than is usually assumed. Attacks by the Israel Defense Force (IDF) on the regular Arab armies (Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi, and Egyptian) ended in most cases in Israel's defeat. Israeli victories, which allowed the extension of the territories under its control, were gained in the fighting against the unorganized Palestinians and the semi-military Arab Liberation Army. The only significant military achievement in the war was the victory of Yigal Allon's forces over the Egyptians in southern Palestine. This success was gained at the conclusion of a debate between Allon and another IDF senior commander over the best way to conduct of offensive operations, a debate that provides a key to understanding the reason for Allon's remarkable achievement compared to the lesser performance of other IDF commanders. However, Allon's brilliant military leadership was the result of intuition and not of professional military education, a factor that had a negative effect on some of his decisions.

Examining thematic elements in strategic business risk

“…During the American War of Independence, US General George Washington chose to attack British forces across the Delaware during extreme winter conditions (with reduced troop levels) when conventional doctrine would have suggested the futility of such an action. Israeli General Yigal Allon's defeat of the Egyptian Army in Southern Palestine in 1948 was attributed solely to intuition (Tal, 2004). During the Falklands War, the British Commander Major General Moore surprised Argentine forces by staging a forced troop march (popularly referred to as “yomp”) of the Parachute Regiment and the 45 Commando Battalion (thereby gaining mobility initiative)[1].…”

The Jew and the tank: Habit and habitus towards a theodicy of war

“…‘Of the 25 Haganah/IDF brigade commanders who served in the 1948 war, only 7 were British army veterans, and of nearly 130 battalion commanders, approximately 35 were such. It is noteworthy that despite their military experience, none of the veterans had any formal military education or experience in command of combat units’ (Tal, 2004: 885–909).…”