Between Caucasus and caliphate: the splintering of the North Caucasus insurgency

Abstract

In December 2014, several high-ranking field commanders from the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz, IK), an insurgent and designated terrorist group in Russia's North Caucasus, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Following the subsequent defection of many of the IK's surviving commanders, IS consolidated its regional presence with the establishment of a formal branch, the Caucasus Wilayah (IS/CW). This paper uses Social Movement Theory's concept of framing to interpret North Caucasus insurgent leaders' response to the Syrian conflict and identify the differences in the competing factions' articulated ideologies. It finds that IS/CW leaders have sought to draw on the emotional appeal of the "caliphate" and redirect it back into the local insurgency, while neglecting to articulate alternative tactics or goals. Those leaders who remained loyal to the IK, by contrast, rooted their opposition in jihadi scholarship and rejected the legitimacy of the "caliphate". However, apparent ideological differences have been exacerbated by communication difficulties that have hindered leaders' ability to negotiate internal and external pressures. This paper contributes to understandings of the differences between the competing factions, illustrates how groups can seek to strengthen their appeal by avoiding explicitness, and demonstrates the importance of operational context in considering ideological change.

Replacing the standard bearer: Theorising leadership transition in insurgencies

“…The first pledge of allegiance to IS had some suspicious features that suggested security service involvement. 99 Therefore, the pledge can be interpreted as part of an effort to flush internal disputes into the open, which other leaders later acknowledged dragged on for some time. Insurgent leaders demonstrated an acute awareness of the dangers of authorities capitalising on internal disputes.…”

Iraq

“…By September that year, IS had expanded its influence over a larger area of Iraq, but the Iraqi areas under de facto control of IS were looking thinner. Al-Baghdadi's influence had spread across areas of North Africa (Algeria, Libya and Tunisia), West Africa (Nigeria), Egypt (Sinai), the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia and Yemen), Afghanistan and Pakistan by 2015, and it had even spread as far as establishing a wilayah in the Caucasus (Youngman, 2016).…”

Радикализация И Неравенство В Нарративах Второго Городского Поколения Мусульманской Северокавказской Молодежи

“…Третий этап характеризуется значительным снижением активности радикаль ных групп на Северном Кавказе, что связано, вопервых, с организационным разгромом многих сетевых джихадистских структур и уничтожением их лидеров, а вовторых, с появлением так называемого Исламского государства (запрещен С. И. Поляков, Ю. В. Епанова ГОСУДАРСТВО И ОБЩЕСТВО ного в РФ), вследствие чего значительная часть радикалов выехала на территорию Сирии и Ирака [Stephens, 2016;Youngman, 2016]. Нынешний этап можно назвать периодом относительного затишья.…”