Between a ‘Kingdom’ and a hard place: the Dutch Caribbean and the Venezuelan migration crisis

Abstract

The small island developing states (SIDS) of the Dutch Caribbean have categorized themselves as ill-equipped to provide adequate protection for vulnerable migrants and refugees from Venezuela. Their status as semi-autonomous states with sovereignty over migration matters but whose foreign policy is governed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands distinguishes them from other SIDS in the Caribbean also experiencing increasing arrivals. The paper analyses this issue relying on interviews with elites involved in the fields of human rights, justice and migration management; content analysis of media reports; as well as archival research. The research shows that a confluence of factors has impacted the islands' response, including their small size, regional geo-politics, and a deficient refugee protection framework. The research also reveals a contest of responsibility for migrant protection between the local and Kingdom governments, which has jeopardized the capacity of the states of Aruba and Curaçao to effectively address the migrant crisis, with negative implications for undocumented migrants. The paper contributes to forced migration scholarship by providing data on the Dutch Caribbean, which along with other countries in the Southern Caribbean have been disproportionately impacted by the crisis relative to their size.

Cross‐border mobility, inequality and migration intermediaries: Labour migration from Nepal to Malaysia

“…Intermediaries play key roles in helping migrant workers from poorer nations overcome inequalities in a world in which mobility is reserved for the rich (Alpes, 2017;Jones & Sha, 2020;Sanchez, 2014;Sha, 2021a;Spener, 2009). Research shows intermediaries may influence whether, where and how people migrate (Cranston et al, 2018;Jones & Sha, 2020;Sha, 2021aSha, , 2021bSpaan & Naerssen, 2018;Xiang & Lindquist, 2018). They help migrants navigate complex bureaucratic, time-consuming, costly and often corrupt processes (Castles et al, 2009;Cranston et al, 2018;Kern & Müller-Böker, 2015).…”

“…They utilise their professional knowledge to direct migrants to one destination over another (Cranston et al, 2018;Spaan & Naerssen, 2018). They offer information and financial support, facilitating transport, accommodation and employment (Jones & Sha, 2020;Martin, 2017;Massey et al, 1987;Spaan & Naerssen, 2018). They indirectly enable migrants to contribute to their families' schooling, housing, and general welfare through remittances (for a review see Sha, 2021a).…”

“…In the Nepal-Malaysia context, migrant workers are from rural backgrounds with limited education and income. Facing tightening immigration controls and complex bureaucracy in Malaysia, these migrant workers are unable to navigate procedures, which are time-consuming, costly and beyond their capability to negotiate (Jones & Sha, 2020). Moreover, frequent changes in regulations in both destination and origin countries make it difficult for migrants to keep up (Krissman, 2005;Žabko et al, 2018).…”

“…social networks (including kin, friendship and locality); village brokers or sub-agents; and recruitment agencies. By exploring who helps with what and how, we highlight interconnections (Jones & Sha, 2020;Lindquist et al, 2012;Sha, 2021b;Xiang & Lindquist, 2014) and trust (Lindquist, 2017) among these actors, which are key in enabling migration and overcoming inequality in mobility.…”

“…Migration intermediaries are variously described as brokers, dalals, taikongs, placement agencies, migration industry, people smugglers, human traffickers, coyotes or immigration consultancies. This article adopts the working definition proposed by Jones and Sha (2020):…”