Bertrand Competition in a Mixed Duopoly Market*

Sanjo, Yasuo

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02102.x

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 7 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…See, among others, d' Aspremont et al (1979), Cremer et al (1991), Sanjo (2009) and Inoue et al (2009). The cost difference between firms often yields some problems, such as the non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed Duopoly, Product Differentiation and Competition*

Kitahara¹,

Matsumura²

2012

The Manchester School

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We examine the relationship between the equilibrium price and the degree of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly in which a welfare‐maximizing public enterprise competes against a profit‐maximizing private firm. Existing works on private economy show that increased product differentiation mitigates price competition. We find that, in a mixed economy, increased product differentiation can accelerate competition when the demand is elastic. The private firm chooses to locate itself too close to the public firm (and thus makes the resulting degree of product differentiation too low) for social welfare, which never appears in the private economy.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed Duopoly, Product Differentiation and Competition*

Kitahara¹,

Matsumura²

2012

The Manchester School

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“…Our paper adds to the literature on mixed oligopolies, which studies markets in which private firms interested in maximising profits compete with public firms interested in maximising social welfare. Among this literature, our paper is close from a formal perspective to the work embedded in a Hotelling framework, such as Matsumura and Matsushima (2003), Lu and Poddar (2007), Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008), Sanjo (2009) and Kitahara and Matsumura (2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Mixed Duopoly With Switching Costs

Fernández‐Ruiz

2018

Jpn Econ Rev

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We examine the effects of switching costs in a two‐period Hotelling‐type model where a profit‐maximising private firm competes with a welfare‐maximising public firm. We show that, in contrast with the case in which both firms are private, where switching costs raise prices in both periods, in the mixed duopoly they raise prices in the second period but reduce them in the first period. Moreover, the first‐period price reduction is of such magnitude that switching costs reduce firms’ profits and raise consumer welfare. We also find that switching costs affect the consequences of privatisation in favour of firms and against consumers.

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“…In this note we check the robustness of some results of the model developed by Sanjo (Sanjo, Y. (2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Sanjo (2009) analyses a mixed duopoly market in which firms are horizontally differentiated and compete on price. He considers three types of games according to the firms’ timing for setting prices: (i) firms set simultaneously prices (simultaneous‐move game), (ii) partially privatized firm prices first and becomes a leader (partially privatized firm leadership game), and (iii) partially privatized firm is a follower that prices after private firm (private firm leadership game).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%