Berkeley on Inconceivability and Impossibility

Abstract

Contrary to a popular reading of his modal epistemology, Berkeley does not hold that inconceivability entails impossibility, and he cannot therefore argue the impossibility of mind‐independent matter by appealing to facts about what we cannot conceive. Berkeley is explicit about this constraint on his metaphysical argumentation, and, I argue, does respect it in practice. Popular mythology about the ‘master argument’ notwithstanding, the only passages in which he might plausibly seem to employ the principle that inconceivability entails impossibility are those that argue for the inseparability of primary from secondary qualities. However, an alternative reading of these texts is available that is both consistent with Berkeley's express modal epistemology and credible in its own right.

The Bishop’s Church: Berkeley’s Master Argument and the Paradox of Knowability

“…Hylas: When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition. (1999,167) For Berkeley, anything which gives rise to a contradiction (or, as he sometimes terms it, a repugnancy) is impossible (see Holden 2019). I suggest Berkeley is making such an inference in the Master Argument.…”

“…Though the labouring mind exert and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. (Berkeley 1999, 151) Thomas Holden (2019) argues that these and related passages are strong evidence against the claim that Berkeley believed that inconceivability entails impossibility. One might also suggest they tell against Berkeley's adherence to a (much weaker) principle like DCP.…”

Why Can An Idea Be Like Nothing But Another Idea? A Conceptual Interpretation of Berkeley's Likeness Principle

“…Ott and Holden both argue that Berkeley explicitly rejects this principle (citing, e.g., PHK §81 and DHP 232-33). See Pappas 1995, Rickless 2013: 112, 132, 181-82, Winkler 1989: 30-31, Ott 2015, Holden 2019 located. These are extrinsic properties of the post box.…”

“…Pappas (1995), Rickless (2013: 112, 132, 181–82), and Winkler (1989: 30–31) each think Berkeley does hold that if something is inconceivable, then it is impossible. Ott (2015) and Holden (2019) both argue that Berkeley explicitly rejects this principle (citing, for example, §81 of the ‘Principles’ and §§ 232–33 of ‘Three Dialogues’)…”

“… 19 See Holden (2019) for an in-depth discussion of Berkeley's views on inconceivability and impossibility.…”