Berkeley: An Interpretation

Abstract

This book is an interpretation of Berkeley's immaterialism or ‘idealism’: an exposition of his arguments, an assessment of their significance, and an explanation (inevitably partial) of their content and form. In the first five chapters, I explore a range of themes that seem, on the surface, to be distant from Berkeley's denial of matter or material substance: his account of intentionality; his attack on abstract ideas; his repudiation of simple ideas; his affirmation of objective necessity; and his appeal to intelligibility in understanding cause and effect relations. In Ch. 6, I show how Berkeley's consideration of these themes shaped his defence of immaterialism. In the final three chapters, I examine some of the consequences of immaterialism and the challenges confronting it: the existence of unperceived objects; the success of modern corpuscularian science; and the nature and existence of mind or spiritual substance.

Berkeley on the “Twofold state of things”

“…32 Cummins leans on PHK 8, where Berkeley writes ''I appeal to anyone whether it be 29 See also NB 51 for a similar passage. 30 Winkler (1989), especially Chap. 6.…”

George Berkeley’s proof for the existence of God

“…Kenneth Winkler dismisses Berkeley's proof for the existence of God on just these grounds: ''[i]n the end the argument cannot of course succeed, if only because the evidence will not be enough to convince us that the existence of an infinitely wise and perfect God is even part of the best explanation of ideas of sense. The attributes named simply go too far beyond the ideas they are invoked to explain'' (Winkler 1989).…”

Something-We-Know-Not-What, Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley, Meaning and Minds

“…25 See in this regard Notebooks B51: "A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each, ergo he cannot say any thing which is not an idea is like or unlike an idea." 26 Winkler (1989). My discussion of the likeness principle here is largely inspired by Winkler's reading. principle, that if one has no experiential basis for seeing that x is like y because one has no experience of y, then also one cannot meaningfully assert that x is like y, hence cannot meaningfully assert that x represents y.…”

“…Some of the best discussions in the literature can be found inCummins (1968),Winkler (1989), andRyan (2006).…”