Bergmann’s Dilemma and Internalism’s Escape

DePoe, John M.

doi:10.1007/s12136-012-0154-4

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In cases (1), (2), and (3), the Mādhva can assert that they have an awareness of the relevant facts through direct acquaintance, which occurs when a person is acquainted with an object by standing in a direct cognitive relationship to it (Russell (1910)). As John DePoe states, ‘direct acquaintance is a kind of awareness that is unmediated, non-inferential, and does not involve the application of any concepts’ (DePoe (2012), 419). Following Richard Fumerton (1995, 73–79), DePoe states that an individual has non-inferential justification for believing a proposition P when they are directly acquainted with the fact that P, directly acquainted with the thought that P, and directly acquainted with the correspondence that holds between the fact that P and the thought that P (DePoe (2012), 420).…”

Section: Addressing Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If it is not, then the Mādhva remains exposed to the SPO. Nevertheless, the Mādhva, following DePoe, can maintain that only a weak awareness of this correspondence is required and that such weak awareness is far from being the type of stray hunch or arbitrary conviction that Bergmann describes when defining the SPO (DePoe (2012), 421).…”

Section: Addressing Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Are there de jure objections to Mādhvic belief?

Gupta

2021

Rel. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recently, Erik Baldwin and Tyler McNabb have brought Madhva's epistemological framework into active dialogue with Alvin Plantinga's religious epistemology and have argued that individuals within Madhva's tradition cannot make full use of Plantinga's epistemology, according to which, Christian belief resists de jure objections and can also have warrant. While I do not contest this specific claim, I demonstrate that an analysis of Madhva's epistemological framework reveals that this framework has its own resources through which it can resist de jure objections. I address various objections to the rationality of Mādhvic belief and conclude that there are no de jure objections to Mādhvic belief that are independent of de facto objections.

show abstract

Section: Addressing Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Addressing Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are there de jure objections to Mādhvic belief?

Gupta

2021

Rel. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Contemporary acquaintance theorists—i.e., those who appeal to the philosophical notion of acquaintance in a substantial and positive way—include Balog (2012, 2019), Bigelow and Pargetter (1990, 2006), BonJour (2001, 2003a), Brewer (2004, 2011, 2019), Campbell (2002, 2009), Chalmers (1996, 2003, 2007, 2010), Coleman (2019), DePoe (2011, 2012, 2018), Dickie (2010), Dickinson (2019), Duncan (2015, 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2020, forthcoming), Fales (1996), Fish (2009), Fumerton (1995, 2001, 2005, 2019), Gertler (2001, 2011, 2012), Giustina (forthcoming), Goff (2015), Graham and Horgan (2000), Hasan (2011, 2013a, 2013b), Hellie (2007, 2010), Howell (2013), Levine (2006, 2008, 2010, 2019a, 2019b), Lund (1994, 2005, 2014), McDowell (1986), McGinn (1996, 2008), McGrew (1995, 1999), Moser (1989, 2009), Nida‐Rümelin (1995, 1998, 2007), Pautz (2007, 2017), Pitt (2004, …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bergmann (2006, §1) appeals to a similar argument to criticize epistemic internalism (which many classical foundationalists accept). See DePoe (2012) and Hasan (2011) for acquaintance‐friendly responses.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Acquaintance

Duncan

2021

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To be acquainted with something (in the philosophical sense of "acquainted" discussed here) is to be directly aware of it. The idea that we are acquainted with certain things we experience has been discussed throughout the history of Western Philosophy, but in the early 20th century it gained especially focused attention among analytic philosophers who drew their inspiration from Bertrand Russell's work on acquaintance. Since then, many philosophers-particularly those working on self-knowledge or perception-have used the notion of acquaintance to explain various facts about human experience and knowledge. In this paper, I offer an overview of this work, with particular focus on the resurgent literature on acquaintance in contemporary analytic philosophy. After more fully explaining what acquaintance is (or is supposed to be), I describe some reasons for thinking that we are indeed acquainted with certain things we experience, and then I survey some of the facts about experience and knowledge that acquaintance may help explain. 1 | INTRODUCTION This paper is about acquaintance-an especially direct mental relation that we (allegedly) bear to certain things we experience, such as colors, smells, tastes, pains, and itches. This philosophical notion has received renewed interest and use of late, but it has also invited misunderstanding and skepticism. My aim in this paper is to dispel some of that misunderstanding and, hopefully, some of the skepticism too. Most contemporary philosophers who appeal to acquaintance draw their inspiration from Bertrand Russell (1911, 1912), who characterizes acquaintance as direct awareness. This differs from the ordinary sense of "acquaintance," as in "Hector and Paula are acquaintances" (or related knowledge attributions, such as "Hector knows Paula"). For one may be acquainted with something in that sense without being directly aware of it.

show abstract

Justification by acquaintance

DePoe

2021

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Bergmann’s Dilemma and Internalism’s Escape

Cited by 6 publications

References 13 publications

Are there de jure objections to Mādhvic belief?

Are there de jure objections to Mādhvic belief?

Acquaintance

Justification by acquaintance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About