Benchmarking global supply chains: the power of the ‘ethical audit’ regime

Abstract

Abstract. This article critically investigates the growing power and effectiveness of the

A move beyond sustainability certification: The evolution of the chocolate industry's sustainable sourcing practices

“…The Dutch, German, and Swiss governments also have voluntary programs in place to encourage sustainable cocoa imports. It remains to be seen how these requirements will influence corporate sourcing practices, with some scholars being skeptical of the regulations' ability to drive meaningful change (LeBaron & Lister, ).…”

Outsourcing governance: states and the politics of a ‘global value chain world’

“…It has been well documented that the functions of regulatory governance have been assumed increasingly by private actors, especially in relation to labour and environmental standards (Mayer and Gereffi 2010, Vogel 2010, Büthe and Mattli 2011, Esbenshade 2012, Haufler 2013, Locke 2013, Auld 2014, LeBaron and Lister 2015. Private actors are increasingly cast as regulators, important development actors and agents of global justice.…”

States and the Political Economy of Unfree Labour

“…The active withdrawal of the state from regulatory and enforcement functions has enabled -and purposefully promoted -the rise of a private labour governance regime, which has included a range of voluntary, industry-led tools and initiatives ranging from codes of conduct to certification schemes and self-monitoring through private audit firms (Ebenshade 2004, Taylor 2011, Fransen 2012, LeBaron and Lister 2015. The US state's reduction of enforcement of labour standards has been buttressed by the claim that companies are largely capable of setting and enforcing their own labour standards, and where they fall short, it is the job of consumers to hold them accountable.…”

“…The Department of Labor's enforcement tools includes 'monetary penalties, temporary restraining orders to prevent the shipment of "hot goods", injunctions to compel future compliance, and a prohibition against intimidating employees who complain' (Weil 2009: 13). Auditors, by contrast, cannot even require companies to open locked drawers (also Esbenshade 2004, Allain et al 2013, LeBaron and Lister 2015. Most private auditing mechanisms rarely, if ever, cover third-party labour intermediaries, whose key innovation is a blurring of the lines of accountability and liability between workers and employers, thus leaving the employers of sizable swathes of the US-working population removed from scrutiny.…”