Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment

Schönherr, Julius; Gomez, Javiera Perez

doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01672-7

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 57 publications

(41 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…An additional advantage of this way of solving the puzzle is that it overcomes an independent objection to encroachment arguments in the literature. For instance, Julius Schönherr and Javiera Perez Gomez (2022) have recently argued that pragmatic encroachment has the consequence of making it harder for victims of epistemic injustice to know, because the risk of prejudice against such victims raises the threshold for the justification of their beliefs 23 . If my argument here works, this is not in fact a consequence of encroachment views.…”

Section: A Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Social Group Moral Encroachment

Mitova

2023

Episteme

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to moral encroachers, the moral stakes of a belief partly determine how much evidence we need for the belief to count as knowledge. This view concerns the beliefs of individual believers. In this paper, I argue for a social group version of moral encroachment: dominant groups, such as white people or men, need to have more evidence than the marginalised in order for some of their beliefs to constitute knowledge. I argue for this claim in three steps. First, I spell out the group moral stakes involved – the harms dominant knowers cause the marginalised and the knowledge economy. Second, I show off the theoretical benefits of having the notion of social group moral encroachment at our disposal: it can be an invaluable tool for decolonial and feminist epistemologists if they want to avoid the relativistic ring to their views (a ring that tends to put off many well-wishers). Finally, I start on a positive account of social group moral encroachment by addressing a potential puzzle and responding to objections.

show abstract

Section: A Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Social Group Moral Encroachment

Mitova

2023

Episteme

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The second is high-stakes: because Nilam is the only person of color in the room, if she is wrong about the principle of nonmaleficence, 'her professor and many fellow students will think, on the basis of prejudice, that people of color are underprepared'. 34 The thought here is that, given the risk of being wrong in the second case, Nilam cannot rationally rely on her belief of what the principle of nonmaleficence entails (e.g. by raising her hand and answering the question).…”

Section: Microaggressions and Rational Self-doubtmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But while the former view has received considerable attention within the growing philosophical literature on microaggression, 5 the latter has only been mentioned in passing. 6 In this article, I explore this latter view by appealing to what Julius Schönherr and I have recently called 'encroachment injustice': the injustice that takes place when prejudice prevents an agent from having knowledge by making it more difficult for her to rely on a belief. 7 I then consider two strategies from the literature on epistemic injustice that might help to undermine this rational but unjust self-doubt: adopting an anti-prejudice attitude and developing the concept of microaggression as a hermeneutical resource.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pushed to the Edge of Knowing: Microaggression and Self‐doubt

Gomez

2022

J Applied Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Self‐doubt, microaggression theorists tend to agree, is a central harm of microaggression: microaggressees often do not know whether a microaggression actually took place. On the standard view, this self‐doubt is unjust because it is misplaced, for microaggressees doubt their own knowledge as a consequence of being repeatedly subject to what Miranda Fricker calls ‘testimonial injustice’. But there is a different way of accounting for this self‐doubt: that it is unjust because microaggressees actually lack knowledge that a microaggression took place. On this view, self‐doubt is unjust not because it is misplaced, but because it is rational. In this article, I explore this latter view in relation to what Julius Schönherr and I have called ‘encroachment injustice’: the injustice that occurs when prejudice prevents someone from having knowledge they would otherwise have had. I then consider some seemingly promising strategies for undermining rational self‐doubt and argue that they are subject to important limitations that reveal some of the difficulties that microaggressees face when attempting to know whether a microaggression took place.

show abstract

Blameless Moral Criticism – the Case of Moral Disappointment

Schönherr

2022

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In discussing the ways in which we hold each other accountable for immoral conduct, philosophers have often focused on blame, aiming to specify adequate responses to wrongdoing. In contrast, theorizing about the ways we can appropriately respond to minor moral mistakes -i.e., criticizable conduct that is bad but not wrong -has largely been neglected. My first goal in this paper is, thus, to draw attention to this blind spot and argue that a separate account of blameless moral criticism is desirable. My second goal is to propose one way to explicate the contrast between blaming and blameless moral criticism in terms of the contrast between moral anger and moral disappointment: while moral anger, as many argue, is an appropriate response to moral wrongdoing, moral disappointment, but not moral anger, is an appropriate response to these minor moral mistakes.

show abstract

Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment

Cited by 4 publications

References 57 publications

Social Group Moral Encroachment

Social Group Moral Encroachment

Pushed to the Edge of Knowing: Microaggression and Self‐doubt

Blameless Moral Criticism – the Case of Moral Disappointment

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About