Believing details known to have been suggested

Abstract

In two experiments, participants viewed a videotape of a simulated armed robbery, later answered misleading questions about it, and then finally completed a source monitoring test. For the test, participants were asked to indicate for each test item whether it was (1) seen in the video only, (2) read about in the questions only, (3) both seen and read about, (4) not remembered or (5) known to have occurred but the source was unclear. The latter response category was included on the test to remove source guessing and to ensure that attributions to ‘video’, ‘questions' or ‘both’ were caused by false conscious recollection. In Expt 1, robust misinformation effects were obtained with both 1‐ and 48‐hour delays between receiving misinformation and the memory test. However, suggested objects were more likely to receive ‘video only’ attributions at long delay than at short. Experiment 2 verified that it was the interval between receiving the misinformation and the test, and not the interval between viewing the video and receiving the misinformation, that determined the effect of delay in Expt 1. The results are explained by assuming that, at short delay, participants remembered reading about the suggested objects and could discount the ‘video only’ category. However, despite accurately remembering the source of suggested information, the misinformation effect as measured by ‘both’ responses was not diminished. Thus, remembering that misinformation was suggested does not necessarily stop the creation of false memories.

Reduction of the misinformation effect by arousal induced after learning

“…The rate of misinformation endorsement was consistent with and even slightly higher than in previous studies (Cann & Katz, 2005;Tomes & Katz, 1997), possibly because of the additional events and the longer interval between encoding and testing (Higham, 1998).…”

How eyewitnesses resist misinformation: Social postwarnings and the monitoring of memory characteristics

“…In some studies, the influence persisted despite postwarnings (Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994;Frost, Ingraham, & Wilson, 2002;Greene et al, 1982;Higham, 1998;Zaragoza & Lane, 1994, Experiment 4), whereas in others it was reduced (Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001;Highhouse & Bottrill, 1995;Meade & Roediger, 2002) or even eliminated by postwarning manipulations (Blank, 1998;Wright, 1993;Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989). In research reported by Lindsay (1990), a postwarning diminished the misinformation effect only when the event and the postevent source shared many characteristics, not when they shared only a few characteristics.…”

“…In most studies, the postwarning took the form of an explicit instruction alerting participants more or less directly to discrepancies between the witnessed event and the postevent information. Apparently, postwarnings that are rather unspecific (Belli et al, 1994;Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983;Frost et al, 2002;Zaragoza & Lane, 1994) or are phrased in the subjunctive mood (Greene et al, 1982;Higham, 1998) are less effective than postwarnings that are specific concerning misleading details (Wright, 1993) or that are spelled out in the indicative mood (e.g., Lindsay, 1990), thus pointing out definite discrepancies between event and postevent information. 1 Furthermore, eyewitnesses are apparently less likely to report misleading items if there is an additional interpersonal or social incentive to resist the influence of misinformation (see Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001).…”

Habitual acceptance of misinformation: Examination of individual differences and source attributions

“…Next to each number were a yes/no response and five alternative source response options (i.e., saw, read, both, don't know, and neither). Higham (1998) suggested this five-source option in order to rule out the possibility of source guessing arising from familiarity misjudgments. The meaning of the first three of these options is self-evident.…”