Belief semantics of authorization logic

Hirsch, Andrew K.; Clarkson, Michael R.

doi:10.1145/2508859.2516667

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…Such chains of delegation are often considered in authorisation logics (see e.g. Abadi's survey (Abadi 2003)), but rarely given a formal semantics (Hirsch and Clarkson 2013), let alone one that can be applied in a setting as general as causal models.…”

Section: Examples Of Causal Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Properties as Nested Causal Statements

Soloviev,

Halpern

2021

Preprint

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Thinking in terms of causality helps us structure how different parts of a system depend on each other, and how interventions on one part of a system may result in changes to other parts. Therefore, formal models of causality are an attractive tool for reasoning about security, which concerns itself with safeguarding properties of a system against interventions that may be malicious. As we show, many security properties are naturally expressed as nested causal statements: not only do we consider what caused a particular undesirable effect, but we also consider what caused this causal relationship itself to hold. We present a natural way to extend the Halpern-Pearl (HP) framework for causality to capture such nested causal statements. This extension adds expressivity, enabling the HP framework to distinguish between causal scenarios that it could not previously naturally tell apart. We moreover revisit some design decisions of the HP framework that were made with non-nested causal statements in mind, such as the choice to treat specific values of causal variables as opposed to the variables themselves as causes, and may no longer be appropriate for nested ones.

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Section: Examples Of Causal Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Properties as Nested Causal Statements

Soloviev,

Halpern

2021

Preprint

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“…These reasoning principles could be expanded and used in other logics. For instance, using the tools developed in Section 6, we should be able to give non-interference proofs for logics like NAL [SWS11] and FOCAL [HC13] which reason about implication and disjunction. We should also be able to add disjunction and implication to logics like DCC [Aba06, ABHR99] while still providing a non-interference theorem.…”

Section: Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

First-Order Logic for Flow-Limited Authorization

Hirsch,

de Amorim,

Cecchetti

et al. 2020

Preprint

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We present the Flow-Limited Authorization First-Order Logic (FLAFOL), a logic for reasoning about authorization decisions in the presence of information-flow policies. We formalize the FLAFOL proof system, characterize its proof-theoretic properties, and develop its security guarantees. In particular, FLAFOL is the first logic to provide a non-interference guarantee while supporting all connectives of first-order logic. Furthermore, this guarantee is the first to combine the notions of non-interference from both authorization logic and information-flow systems. All theorems in this paper are proven in Coq.

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“…This line of work, which inspired our formulation of the belief-vulnerability, is based on the KullbackLeibler distance, a concept related to Shannon entropy which in general, as already mentioned in Section 3, fails to characterize many realistic attacks scenarios. Belief semantics has been explored also in the context of other security properties in [39,40]. In a recent paper [41], Hussein proposed a generalization of the Bayesian-based framework of [22] based on DempsterShafer theory.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantifying leakage in the presence of unreliable sources of information

Hamadou

Palamidessi

Sassone

2017

Journal of Computer and System Sciences

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Belief and min-entropy leakage are two well-known approaches to quantify information flow in security systems. Both concepts stand as alternatives to the traditional approaches founded on Shannon entropy and mutual information, which were shown to provide inadequate security guarantees. In this paper we unify the two concepts in one model so as to cope with the frequent (potentially inaccurate, misleading or outdated) attackers' side information about individuals on social networks, online forums, blogs and other forms of online communication and information sharing. To this end we propose a new metric based on min-entropy that takes into account the adversary's beliefs.

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Belief semantics of authorization logic

Cited by 7 publications

References 50 publications

Security Properties as Nested Causal Statements

Security Properties as Nested Causal Statements

First-Order Logic for Flow-Limited Authorization

Quantifying leakage in the presence of unreliable sources of information

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