Belief in conspiracy theories and intentions to engage in everyday crime

Jolley, Daniel; Douglas, Karen M.; Leite, Ana C.; Schrader, Tanya

doi:10.1111/bjso.12311

Cited by 131 publications

(141 citation statements)

References 54 publications

(81 reference statements)

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“…Results showed that those who were more generally inclined toward conspiracy theories were more likely to agree that “violence is sometimes an acceptable way to express disagreement with the government” than those less inclined. Those inclined toward conspiracy belief are also in favor of lax gun ownership laws (Uscinski & Parent, ), show a willingness to conspire themselves (Douglas & Sutton, ), and show greater intentions to engage in everyday crime (Jolley, Douglas, Leite, & Schrader, in press). Again, we must caution that findings from correlational research do not imply causality (but see Jolley et al, [in press] for experimental findings).…”

Section: Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Those inclined toward conspiracy belief are also in favor of lax gun ownership laws (Uscinski & Parent, ), show a willingness to conspire themselves (Douglas & Sutton, ), and show greater intentions to engage in everyday crime (Jolley, Douglas, Leite, & Schrader, in press). Again, we must caution that findings from correlational research do not imply causality (but see Jolley et al, [in press] for experimental findings). Sadly, however, the world is all too familiar with cases of people who have committed violence on the basis of conspiracy ideas (e.g., Timothy McVeigh, Anders Breivik) and of governments committing violence based on conspiracy theories and propaganda (e.g., Nazi Germany, Stalin’s Russia).…”

Section: Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Understanding Conspiracy Theories

Douglas

Uscinski

Sutton

et al. 2019

Political Psychology

Self Cite

889

907

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Scholarly efforts to understand conspiracy theories have grown significantly in recent years, and there is now a broad and interdisciplinary literature. In reviewing this body of work, we ask three specific questions. First, what factors are associated with conspiracy beliefs? Our review of the literature shows that conspiracy beliefs result from a range of psychological, political, and social factors. Next, how are conspiracy theories communicated? Here, we explain how conspiracy theories are shared among individuals and spread through traditional and social media platforms. Next, what are the societal risks and rewards associated with conspiracy theories? By focusing on politics and science, we argue that conspiracy theories do more harm than good. We conclude by suggesting several promising avenues for future research.

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Section: Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Conspiracy Theories

Douglas

Uscinski

Sutton

et al. 2019

Political Psychology

Self Cite

889

907

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Whilst conspiracy theorizing may discourage people from following normative prevention behaviour, perception of greater risk could suppress this effect. Previous work has showcased that conspiracy believers are motivated by self-interests (e.g., Cichocka et al, 2016) and adopt self-serving behaviours (e.g., Jolley et al, 2019). Klofstad et al (2019) found conspiracy beliefs were positively correlated with increased concern about Zika.…”

Section: Risk Perception and Conspiracy Mentalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Looking out for myself: Exploring the relationship between conspiracy mentality, perceived personal risk, and COVID‐19 prevention measures

Marinthe

Brown

Delouvée

et al. 2020

British J Health Psychol

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136

119

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Objectives. This research examined how conspiracy mentality may affect compliance with preventive health measures necessary to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, and the underlying motivations to comply. Design and Method. We conducted two cross-sectional studies (Study 1 N = 762, Study 2 N = 229) on a French population, measuring conspiracy mentality, compliance with preventive health measures, and perceived risks related to COVID-19. We also measured motivations to comply with preventive measures in Study 2. Results. We show that people high in conspiracy mentality are likely to engage in nonnormative prevention behaviours (Study 1), but are less willing to comply with extreme preventive behaviours that are government-driven (Study 2). However, we demonstrate that a perceived risk to oneself (risk of death) and a motivation to protect oneself can act as a suppressor: Conspiracy mentality is linked with an increase in the perception of risk to oneself, which, in turn, is associated with normative compliance. We also find that perceived risk of death explains the relationship between conspiracy mentality and nonnormative prevention behaviours. Conclusions. Our studies showcase how people high in conspiracy theorizing may (dis) engage with prevention behaviours, but that perceived risk and motivation to protect oneself could increase these individuals' compliance. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Conspiracy theory is positively linked to adoption of non-normative behaviours but negatively to normative ones. Conspiracy beliefs are in part linked to self-serving interests.

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“…Reported belief in more than one conspiracy theory was associated with resistance to routine medical interventions including flu vaccination, annual physical examinations and dental visits (Oliver and Wood 2014). More generally, belief in conspiracy theories has been shown to decrease civic engagement and depress other prosocial behavior (Jolley and Douglas 2014;van der Linden 2015;Jolley et al 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collisions Between Institutional and Populist Risk Imaginaries: The “Dark Side” of Negative Asymmetric Thinking

Hagen¹

2019

Preprint

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Expert knowledge informs the construction of public problems from gun violence to disease epidemics to climate change, and institutional actors draw on this knowledge to implement public policy to mitigate or repair the related harms. The expanding role of experts and institutions in managing risks has come at a time of declining public trust in institutions and a legitimacy crisis around expert knowledge. What happens when these tendencies collide? Previous scholarship has examined how disaster arises through failures of foresight, and how cultural-cognitive biases can prevent actors from seeing disasters coming. Less is known about the mobilization of resistance against risk management policies. This theoretical essay examines a particular category of that resistance: conspiracist discourse that frames risk as emanating primarily from perceived secret agendas of institutions and experts that explicitly claim to be acting in the public interest. This essay argues that conspiracy thinking can be best understood as rooted in a “populist risk imaginary,” which is rooted in negative asymmetry, a cultural-cognitive bias that foregrounds the possibility of worst-case outcomes. Conspiracy discourse can be understood as the “dark side” of negative asymmetry, which is otherwise used by service-oriented professionals to sharpen their foresight in preempting future dangers.

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Belief in conspiracy theories and intentions to engage in everyday crime

Cited by 131 publications

References 54 publications

Understanding Conspiracy Theories

Understanding Conspiracy Theories

Looking out for myself: Exploring the relationship between conspiracy mentality, perceived personal risk, and COVID‐19 prevention measures

Collisions Between Institutional and Populist Risk Imaginaries: The “Dark Side” of Negative Asymmetric Thinking

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