2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00479.x
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Being Positive About Negative Facts

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Cited by 70 publications
(29 citation statements)
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“…67 "I will maintain my opposition to negative and general facts, but give an improved account of how to do without them" (Pendlebury 2010 negative facts are mysterious and metaphysically weird entities … Positing their existence is to be avoided if at all possible (Cheyne and Pigden 2008: §2) which is difficult to understand without a certain amount of 'representationalism'. Not even Barker and Jago (2012), despite their unwavering acceptance of negative facts, contemplate the possibility that negativeness has something to do with the contingency of our ways of representing them. They make indeed a most valuable effort to counter the general trend, showing the ease with which negative facts can be logically and ontologically handled in their formal theory.…”
Section: The Search For Minimal Truthmakersmentioning
confidence: 92%
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“…67 "I will maintain my opposition to negative and general facts, but give an improved account of how to do without them" (Pendlebury 2010 negative facts are mysterious and metaphysically weird entities … Positing their existence is to be avoided if at all possible (Cheyne and Pigden 2008: §2) which is difficult to understand without a certain amount of 'representationalism'. Not even Barker and Jago (2012), despite their unwavering acceptance of negative facts, contemplate the possibility that negativeness has something to do with the contingency of our ways of representing them. They make indeed a most valuable effort to counter the general trend, showing the ease with which negative facts can be logically and ontologically handled in their formal theory.…”
Section: The Search For Minimal Truthmakersmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…… It is not difficult to argue that existential facts are not really required. … I will argue in addition that provided we allow ourselves general facts then no further negative facts are needed among our truthmakers" (Armstrong 2004: §5.2: 54). negative facts 77 ; and Barker and Jago (2012) apply their formal treatment to conjunctive, existential, negative existential and universal facts, but reject disjunctive facts, 78 which Jago (2011) admits. 79 What passes unnoticed again is the extent to which the apparent logical form of facts is dependent on our linguistic representation -in turn dependent on the history of our cognitive evolution.…”
Section: The Search For Minimal Truthmakersmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…9 In the next section, I consider this anticipated objection in more detail and offer a principled reply. 7 For the sake of simplicity, I ignore Barker and Jago's (2012) defence of a kind of anti-instantiation relation, e.g. that a isn't G, which they propose to try to rehabilitate negative facts.…”
Section: Modal Instantiation Tiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Let e name the event of writing the Psalms and n name the event of writing Ezra's name. Barker and Jago suggest in a recent paper that we can take omissions to be e and n tied together by the relation of noninstantiation (Barker and Jago 2012). Thus, Ben Sira's omission is the entity composed of e, n, and the relation of noninstantiation.…”
Section: The Identification Strategymentioning
confidence: 99%