When Aristotle rejects Plato’s Form of the Good, he incurs a debt: given that he thinks that goodness is non-univocal—that there is no single, essence-specifying account of goodness covering all good things—he needs to provide an account of how the good things he wishes to compare and bring into ordinal rankings may be so ranked. For he also thinks that two things are commensurable under a single predicate F only if they are univocally F. We are thus left with two families of questions: (i) what, precisely, are Aristotle’s objections to the Form of the Good, and how successful are they? And (ii) on the assumption that they are successful, what is his alternative? Plato, it seems, whatever the final tenability of his theory may be, has an easy time with commensurability. He thinks that everything which qualifies as good does so because it participates in the Form of the Good, and that one good thing is better than another precisely to the degree that it realizes the Form of the Good by its participation in it. Given that according to Aristotle there simply is no Form of the Good, how and how well does he arrive at a defensible account of the commensurability of those good things he wishes to rank as better or worse than one another?