Being and Betterness

Johansson, Jens

doi:10.1017/s0953820810000208

Cited by 21 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…This argument is discussed inBradley (2009), Chapter 3, Section 3.5. 21Johansson (2010) makes this important observation.…”

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confidence: 91%

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Person-Affecting and Non-Identity

Bykvist¹

2021

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According to a popular version of the person-affecting idea of morality, what is better (worse) must be better (worse) for someone. However, there seems to be a clear tension between this idea and some of our considered judgements about cases in which the existence of future people is contingent on our choice. For example, we want to say that creating a very unhappy person makes the world worse, other things being equal. In order to comply with a person-affecting morality in this case, we need to show that coming into existence can be worse for a person, but it does not seem plausible to say that it can be worse for a person to exist than not to exist. This paper discusses some recent attempts to ease this tension, and it is argued that none of these attempts is convincing. That leaves us with only one option: to reject the person-affecting constraint in its current form.

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“…This argument is discussed inBradley (2009), Chapter 3, Section 3.5. 21Johansson (2010) makes this important observation.…”

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confidence: 91%

“… See Temkin (1993a), (1993b), and Holtug (1996. The label "Person-Affecting Restriction" was introduced byGlover (1977), p. 66, but see alsoNarveson (1967).4 See, for instance,Arrhenius & Rabinowicz (2010,Johansson (2010), andHoltug (2001). See also,Adler (2009), and Adler (2011) for similar ideas.…”

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confidence: 99%

Person-Affecting and Non-Identity

Bykvist¹

2021

Preprint

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“…For a more recent discussion, see Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2010). See also Johansson (2010). Johansson challenges the particular defences of Comparability that appear in Roberts (2003) and Holtug (2001).…”

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confidence: 98%

“…Addition Plus , which I discuss in below, is just such a case. Johansson seems to concede the point but argues that we have the option of taking as the operative normative fact not whether the world w′ where p exists is worse for p than w is, but rather whether w′ would be worse for p than w is if “that world [ w′ ] were to obtain” (Johansson, 2010, pt VII). I won't, however, examine closely here whether that distinction is viable.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Asymmetry: A Solution

Roberts

2011

Theoria

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The Asymmetry consists of two claims. (A) That a possible person's life would be abjectly miserable –less than worth living – counts against bringing that person into existence. But (B) that a distinct possible person's life would be worth living or even well worth living does not count in favour of bringing that person into existence. In recent years, the view that the two halves of the Asymmetry are jointly untenable has become increasingly entrenched. If we say all persons matter morally whether they exist or not and on that basis try to explain the first half of the Asymmetry, we lose the second half of the Asymmetry. If we say that some persons do not matter morally and some do and on that basis try to explain the second half of the Asymmetry, we lose the first half of the Asymmetry – or else find ourselves with a principle that is either inconsistent or otherwise deeply troubled in some way that has nothing to do with the content of the Asymmetry itself. In this article, I propose an alternative approach to the Asymmetry which I will call Variabilism. By understanding each and every person, whether existing or not, to matter morally but variably– such that the moral significance of any loss incurred by any person is considered to depend, not on who incurs that loss and whether that person matters morally, but rather on where that loss is incurred in relation to the person who incurs it – we can both nicely ground the two halves of the Asymmetry and avoid the conceptual difficulties that have plagued competing approaches.

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“…See Bykvist, ‘The Benefits of Coming into Existence’. See also Arrhenius and Rabinowicz, ‘Better to Be than Not to Be?’; Johansson, ‘Being and Betterness’; and Roberts, ‘The Asymmetry: A Solution’.…”

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confidence: 99%

An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation

Roberts

2011

Philosophy Compass

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According to the Asymmetry, it is wrong to bring a miserable child into existence but permissible not to bring a happy child into existence. When it comes to procreation, we don’t have complete procreative liberty. But we do have some discretion. The Asymmetry seems highly intuitive. But a plausible account of the Asymmetry has been surprisingly difficult to provide, and it may well be that most moral philosophers – or at least most consequentialists – think that all reasonable efforts to provide such an account have by now been exhausted. In this paper, I argue that, despite the difficulties, the Asymmetry is too important to be set aside. I also note a handful of accounts of the Asymmetry that have been proposed and why they fail. It seems, for example, that it will not do to say that some people matter morally and others don’t, or that a person matters morally in some worlds but not others. My own conclusion is that, while we are bound to say all people matter morally – you, me and the merely possible – we are not bound to say that all their losses– or all ours– matter morally. We can instead distinguish between morally significant and insignificant losses, with the distinction between the two being a matter of where the loss is incurred in relation to the person who incurs it. This way of looking at things – which I call Variabilism– provides the basis for a plausible account of the Asymmetry. The availability of such an account suggests, I think, that our prospects for rescuing the Asymmetry are bright.

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Being and Betterness

Cited by 21 publications

References 6 publications

Person-Affecting and Non-Identity

Person-Affecting and Non-Identity

The Asymmetry: A Solution

An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation

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