2019
DOI: 10.3390/g10030032
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Behavioural Isomorphism, Cognitive Economy and Recursive Thought in Non-Transitive Game Strategy

Abstract: Game spaces in which an organism must repeatedly compete with an opponent for mutually exclusive outcomes are critical methodologies for understanding decision-making under pressure. In the non-transitive game rock, paper, scissors (RPS), the only technique that guarantees the lack of exploitation is to perform randomly in accordance with mixed-strategy. However, such behavior is thought to be outside bounded rationality and so decision-making can become deterministic, predictable, and ultimately exploitable. … Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…More broadly, the mental representation of zero-sum games only with respect to the relationship between items can lead to identical behavior with more traditional representations that preserve both items and outcomes. For example, reference [8] discusses the behavioral isomorphism between zero-sum game strategy rules expressed in terms of the opponent's previous response only versus the participant's previous response and outcome.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…More broadly, the mental representation of zero-sum games only with respect to the relationship between items can lead to identical behavior with more traditional representations that preserve both items and outcomes. For example, reference [8] discusses the behavioral isomorphism between zero-sum game strategy rules expressed in terms of the opponent's previous response only versus the participant's previous response and outcome.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…6 More broadly, the mental representation of zero-sum games only with respect to the relationship between items can lead to identical behavior with more traditional representations that preserve both items and outcomes. For example, reference [8] discusses the behavioral isomorphism between zero-sum game strategy rules expressed in terms of the opponent's previous response only versus the participant's previous response and outcome.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, humans reliably deviate from MS due to the high cognitive load demanded by this strategy, and, contrary expectations about the correlated nature of outcome distribution in the real world [6,7]. These deviations (see [8], for a review) are often expressed via the operant conditioning (reinforcement learning) principles of win-stay and lose-shift [9]. If we are more likely to repeat an action following success or more likely to change an action following failure, then this increases both predictability and the chance of future exploitation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…As an initial test of competitive decision-making in Experiment 1, participants interacted with a computer opponent playing according to a mixed-strategy (MS) in the zero-sum game of Rock, Paper, Scissors (RPS; see 41 for a review). In terms of defining optimal and sub-optimal performance, the Nash 42 equilibrium for RPS against an opponent playing mixed-strategy is for the participant to also play mixed-strategy.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%