Behavioural Determinants of Public Sector Illegal Strikes

Abstract

Cet article est diffusé et préservé par Érudit.Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. www.erudit.org Tous droits réservés © Département des relations industrielles de l 'Université Laval, 1998 © Relat. ind., 1998 Behavioural Determinants of Public Sector Illegal StrikesCases from Canada and the U.S. ROBERT HEBDONNew York State's School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. (Cooke 1983: 99). 1998, vol. 53, n°40034-379X This article develops a framework for analyzing illegal public sector strikes that explains observed patterns of behaviour of employees, unions, managers, and third parties. It is found that no-strike laws diminish such positive effects of right-to-strike bargain ing sy stems as elicitin g in form atio n, adjustin g expectations, and providing catharsis. A new theoretical outline helps understand and explain such illegal strike characteristics as Taking away the right to strike is a bit like eliminating the vapor safety valve on a boiler. Employees need to know that they have this means of relieving their frustrations and internal tension --even if they never use it. Otherwise an explosion is inevitable1. The author acknowledges the valuable research assistance of Jean-Paul Alexandrowicz. , 1998, VOL. 53, N° 4 The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze certain common behavioural characteristics of North American illegal public sector strikes. These strikes are important because they occur in significant numbers, often have devastatingly negative effects, and represent a complete dysfunction of the strike avoidance policy mandate --a central goal of many public sector collective bargaining systems. RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSU.S. strike data for the period 1983-1994 for major strikes of over 1000 employees, reveals only slightly higher mean strike rates 2 (7.7 percent) in states where public sector workers have the right to strike compared to states where strikes are banned (5.3 percent) (Hebdon 1996). In addition, 34 out of 78 major strikes (43.6 percent) were illegal.The effects of these illegal strikes can be severe. They can cause irreparable harm to the public, the collective bargaining parties, and unions. The strike of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) in 1981 provides a stark example, involving a serious threat to the safety of air travel, the firing of thousands of controllers, and the decertification of the union.The continued occurrence of these illegal strikes is virtually guaranteed by the multitude of laws banning strikes by public employees. In Canada, five provinces grant the right to strike to most public employees (Swan 1985;Goldenberg 1988;Gunderson and Hyatt 1996). 3 But all provinces and states restrict the right to strike for some occupations. In the U.S., for example, no less than 38 states prohibit...

Collective action and labour militancy interrupted: Back-to-work legislation and the state of permanent exceptionalism at Air Canada

“…Research on strikes has a rich, interdisciplinary history (Hebdon, 1998), with much of the existing scholarship centring on the quantitative and institutional dimensions leading up to this form of social action (Chaulk and Brown, 2008; Nicholson and Kelly, 1980). But there are fewer studies of the impact of back-to-work legislation when job action is frustrated by government intervention and how this type of state involvement shapes member perspectives on union effectiveness and the institution of collective bargaining (Barling and Milligan, 1987; Macbride et al, 1981; Ng, 1993).…”

“…Industrial relations scholars have also recognized that there exists no common framework of analysis for understanding strikes or the legislation regulating collective action (Hebdon, 1998). Studies of job action in the postal industry, for instance, have indicated that in the case of public sector labour disputes, workers’ feelings towards the government became more negative as a consequence of the nature of the state’s involvement in the strike (Langford, 1996).…”

Expanding the Content Domain of Workplace Aggression: A Three‐level Aggressor–target Taxonomy

“…This includes management's action against (usually unionized) employees, e.g. ‘lock‐outs’ (Hebdon ). Although behaviors such as racial discrimination or sexual harassment may occur occasionally in all organizations, when these behaviors are widely prevalent in a particular organization, they could be construed as organization‐level aggression against a particular group (cf.…”