Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control

Abstract

present a lucid paper (WERDEN, FROEB, AND SHOR [2011]) in which they reject ideas of reforming antitrust based on behavioral economics. The paper by Werden et al. serves the important purpose of enriching the still rather limited literature on behavioral antitrust by identifying some points where being serious about behavioral antitrust could cause the most trouble. If the authors' sole goal had indeed been to hold back behavioral economics at the gate of antitrust, they probably would have been best advised not to write this paper. It is one of the first pieces of literature showing that authors like TOR [2002] and STUCKE [2007] are not talking to bricks anymore when writing about behavioral antitrust. 1 Indeed, it is difficult to disagree with the authors' main points. They are right to remind the reader that the test of a model is how well it predicts outcomes. Therefore the claim that the assumptions of a model remain unproven cannot discredit the rational-choice model. It is also true that many experiments have confirmed predictions based on rational choice, especially when they dealt with market settings. Certainly the authors are right to say that competition policy does not serve to protect efficiency as such, but it protects efficiency generated by competition. Therefore they rightly condemn any attempt to correct inefficient business decisions by means of competition policy if they do not harm competition.But there remain a couple of points where the authors' arguments seem to understate how fundamentally behavioral economics challenges the neoclassical view of antitrust policy. I would like to present three points where I believe this is the case: First, with regard to the authors' opinion that results from the lab do not transfer well to firm behavior, looking at the arguments more closely may lead to a slightly more nuanced conclusion. Second, the authors' argument on paternalism is probably mostly true, but could be wrong in particular cases. Third, the doubts behavioral economics raises with respect to the concept of consumer welfare analysis -a core

A ANÁLISE DA CONCORRÊNCIA NO SÉCULO XXI: Contribuições da Economia Comportamental

“…As poucas referências explícitas à economia comportamental em casos analisados pelo CADE são explicadas pelo fato de que a aferição antitruste se pauta, na esmagadora maioria das vezes, em modelos neoclássicos tradicionais, aplicáveis à organização industrial, assumindo plena racionalidade dos agentes e firmas maximizadoras de lucros (BAILEY, 2015;MORELL, 2011). A mensuração de modelos com formatos universais que partem das premissas acima indicadas é, certamente, de mais automático manuseio, especialmente para previsões/análises prospectivas.…”