Behavior-Based Covert Channel in Cyberspace

Johnson, Daryl; Lutz, Peter; Yuan, Bo

doi:10.1142/9789814295062_0049

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 11 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…Hernandez-Castro et al devise a game-theoretic framework for hiding data in strategic moves in chess, backgammon and Go [25]. Diehl refines the security notions and computes the data players can exchange undetected in multiplayer games [13] Johnson et al formalized the notion of a behaviorbased covert channel where two or more parties purposefully modify the internal states or behavior of an application to communicate information [33]. Such channels have been proposed using various applications, including anti-virus updates [3], web browsing patterns [70], and video games [33].…”

Section: Prior Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Diehl refines the security notions and computes the data players can exchange undetected in multiplayer games [13] Johnson et al formalized the notion of a behaviorbased covert channel where two or more parties purposefully modify the internal states or behavior of an application to communicate information [33]. Such channels have been proposed using various applications, including anti-virus updates [3], web browsing patterns [70], and video games [33]. Hahn, et al propose Castle, which encodes covert information in player activities within real-time strategy game (such as moving units and constructing buildings) [22].…”

Section: Prior Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A First Look at Private Communications in Video Games using Visual Features

Wajid

Kamal²,

Sharjeel³

et al. 2021

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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Internet privacy is threatened by expanding use of automated mass surveillance and censorship techniques. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of using video games and virtual environments to evade automated detection, namely by manipulating elements in the game environment to compose and share text with other users. This technique exploits the fact that text spotting in the wild is a challenging problem in computer vision. To test our hypothesis, we compile a novel dataset of text generated in popular video games and analyze it using state-of-the-art text spotting tools. Detection rates are negligible in most cases. Retraining these classifiers specifically for game environments leads to dramatic improvements in some cases (ranging from 6% to 65% in most instances) but overall effectiveness is limited: the costs and benefits of retraining vary significantly for different games, this strategy does not generalize, and, interestingly, users can still evade detection using novel configurations and arbitrary-shaped text. Communicating in this way yields very low bitrates (0.3-1.1 bits/s) which is suited for very short messages, and applications such as microblogging and bootstrapping off-game communications (dialing). This technique does not require technical sophistication and runs easily on existing games infrastructure without modification. We also discuss potential strategies to address efficiency, bandwidth, and security constraints of video game environments. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such exploration of video games and virtual environments from a computer vision perspective.

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Section: Prior Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Prior Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A First Look at Private Communications in Video Games using Visual Features

Wajid

Kamal²,

Sharjeel³

et al. 2021

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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“…can be drawn, however, the most common way is to classify them by type. Three different types have been widely recognized [14]: storage, timing-based, and behaviorbased covert channels.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Covert Channels-Based Stealth Attacks in Industry 4.0

Alcaraz

Bernieri

Pascucci

et al. 2019

IEEE Systems Journal

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Industry 4.0 advent opens several cyber-threats scenarios originally designed for classic information technology, drawing the attention to serious risks for the modern industrial control networks. To cope with this problem, in this paper we address the security issues related to covert channels applied to industrial networks, identifying the new vulnerability points when information technologies converge with operational technologies such as edge computing infrastructures. Specifically, we define two signaling strategies where we exploit the Modbus/TCP protocol as target to set up a covert channel. Once the threat channel is established, passive and active offensive methodologies are further exploited by implementing and testing them on a real Industrial Internet of Things testbed. The experimental results highlight the potential damage of such specific threats and the easy extrapolation of the attacks to other types of channels in order to show the new risks for the Industry 4.0. Related to this, we discuss some countermeasures offering an overview of possible mitigation and defensive measures.

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“…However, some of them are indirect or informal and require reasoning about potential scenarios in which the conditions might be satisfied (e.g., [30]). Furthermore, those works which do provide some level of formalism, focus primarily on the potential for communication via shared environments through various information flow analyses based on finite state machine models, information theory, and probability theory (e.g., [5,18,26,33]). Perhaps one of the most popular mechanisms for determining the potential for communication for identifying the existence of covert channels is the Shared Resource Matrix technique [20].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Formulation of the Potential for Communication Condition using C2KA

Jaskolka

Khédri

2014

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

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An integral part of safeguarding systems of communicating agents from covert channel communication is having the ability to identify when a covert channel may exist in a given system and which agents are more prone to covert channels than others. In this paper, we propose a formulation of one of the necessary conditions for the existence of covert channels: the potential for communication condition. Then, we discuss when the potential for communication is preserved after the modification of system agents in a potential communication path. Our approach is based on the mathematical framework of Communicating Concurrent Kleene Algebra (C2KA). While existing approaches only consider the potential for communication via shared environments, the approach proposed in this paper also considers the potential for communication via external stimuli.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2014, arXiv:1408.556

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Behavior-Based Covert Channel in Cyberspace

Cited by 7 publications

References 11 publications

A First Look at Private Communications in Video Games using Visual Features

A First Look at Private Communications in Video Games using Visual Features

Covert Channels-Based Stealth Attacks in Industry 4.0

A Formulation of the Potential for Communication Condition using C2KA

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