Becoming part of the gang? Established and nonestablished populist parties and the role of external efficacy

Abstract

In this article, we examine the extent to which the influence of external efficacy on support for populist parties is conditional on the degree to which a populist party is an established player in a given party system. We do so using a two-step regression approach that allows us to investigate the varying effect of external efficacy in a multilevel setting. Making use of data on 23 European Union member states, we empirically demonstrate that the nature of support for populists varies depending on the extent to which these parties are established actors in their national party systems. This is true for Western and Eastern European populist parties. These findings make an important contribution to the broader literature on the success and survival of populist parties. They indicate that these parties do not keep up their image as radical opponents of the national political establishment the more they become electorally successful and join government coalitions.

Less Populist in Power? Online Communication of Populist Parties in Coalition Governments

“…As a consequence, more established populist parties will be under pressure to soften their anti-elite appeals.' Among different forms of political behaviour, populist parties' political communication is especially expected to be influenced by moderation effects (Akkerman et al 2016;Bernhard 2020;Krause and Wagner 2019).…”

“…This should not apply to right-wing populist parties that join a coalition with more leftist parties, as NZF did with Labour in New Zealand. In line with Krause and Wagner (2019), compromises are necessary in coalition governments in order not to endanger the existence of the coalition. Since nativist parties are ideologically closer to the centre right, respective discursive compromises are less necessary.…”

“…Thus, attacks on political elites for being corrupt, selfish and not acting in the people's interests while at the same time praising the supposed people's attitudes and actions are definitive communication features of this party type (Ernst et al 2019a;Rooduijn et al 2014). Scholars assume that these kinds of discourses change as soon as populists enter national governments (Akkerman 2016;Bernhard 2020;Krause and Wagner 2019). The so-called inclusion-moderation thesisoriginally established to explain moderation effects on religious partiessuggests that participation in coalition governments tames populists' communication practices as they are constrained to deliberate and make compromises.…”

“…The so-called inclusion-moderation thesisoriginally established to explain moderation effects on religious partiessuggests that participation in coalition governments tames populists' communication practices as they are constrained to deliberate and make compromises. Incumbent populists struggle with their image as political outsiders because engagement in the daily business of bargaining is expected to have a taming effect on them (Krause and Wagner 2019). Yet, while the inclusion-moderation thesis is widespread among political science scholars, we lack empirical evidence supporting this assumption.…”

Appearing moderate or radical? Radical left party success and the two-dimensional political space

“…In line with the Downsian framework of party competition, abandoning policy purism in favour of more moderate positions is likely to increase their public support. Otherwise they run the risk of being perceived as political pariahs without any substantial influence on policies (March and Keith 2016b;Krause and Wagner 2019).…”