Becoming citizens: Policy feedback and the transformation of the Thai rice farmer

Abstract

Over the past twenty years, Thailand's rice farmers have become one of the country's most important and active political constituencies, a sharp contrast from the previous decades wherein they were treated with neglect or even derision by the Thai political elite. These "political peasants" now actively advocate for and successfully receive extensive subsidies from both authoritarian and democratic governments. What has driven this change? In this essay, we draw on theories of the policy feedback loop wherein policies yield both material and cognitive benefits, which change the political behavior of populations. We argue that the Thaksin Shinawatra government's (2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006) paddy pledging policy altered the mindset of Thai rice farmers, creating a new form of social contract between the rural poor and the state. We demonstrate this by tracing the process through which farmers' political behavior changed, drawing on a variety of evidence, including electoral data, secondary sources, an original survey, focus groups, and interviews with Thai farmers. The paper provides additional understanding regarding the mechanisms through which Thai politics has changed since 2001. On a broader scale, these findings suggest the potential of public policy to create enduring political communities among rural populations.

Which pathway to address interrelated challenges to farm sustainability in Thailand? Views of local actors

“…Moreover, agricultural policies have been traditionally designed in Thailand in a top-down way, even those geared towards capturing farmers’ votes (Ricks and Laiprakobsup 2021 ). Walker’s ( 2012 ) detailed assessment of the relationship between farmers and public actors in the Northern Region of Thailand showed that these relations were aimed at organising flows of resources to support farms.…”

“…There was no room for discussing challenges facing the farms and how to best address them. Moreover, Ricks and Laiprakobsup ( 2021 ) argued that policy implementation can produce lock-ins, in the sense that they frame actors’ expectations about what state intervention should be. They showed that Thai rice farmers’ request for support on rice prices was an upshot of the prevailing policies, thereby pushing discussion on more structural issues into the background.…”

Factors driving Thailand rice farmer decision-making in the choice of marketing channel

“…The vast majority of small-scale farmers are located in the Northeast and North regions (83.23 and 77.63%, respectively) (OAE, 2019). This sector has experienced successive policy interventions ranging from low-interest loans to rice farmers to fixed higher-than-market price for paddy rice (Poapongsakorn and Pantakua, 2014; Ricks and Laiprakobsup, 2021). Four main marketing channels for paddy rice have been used by rice farmers in Thailand (Srisompun, 2014).…”

“…For example, central paddy markets, established in 1980, had a market share of nearly 24% by 1997 (Isvilanonda, 2010) due to the fact that the initial RPS was implemented by the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives which operated in central paddy markets. However, the RPS introduced in 2011 favored rice millers more (Ricks and Laiprakobsup, 2021). By 2013, the share of central paddy markets dropped by nearly half to 12.59% (Srisompun, 2014).…”

“…By 2013, the share of central paddy markets dropped by nearly half to 12.59% (Srisompun, 2014). The RPS ended in 2014 (Ricks and Laiprakobsup, 2021). It is possible that the channel use may have changed again since then.…”