An important question confronting feminist philosophers is why women are sometimes complicit in their own subordination. The dominant view holds that complicity is best understood in terms of adaptive preferences. This view assumes that agents will naturally gravitate away from subordination and towards flourishing as long as they do not have things imposed on them that disrupt this trajectory.However, there is reason to believe that 'impositions' do not explain all of the ways in which complicity can arise. This paper defends a phenomenological account of complicity, which offers an alternative explanation.
| INTRODUCTIONAs Alison Jaggar described it, 'one of the most important questions confronting all feminist theorists…[is] why women who are, after all, a majority in most populations, so often seem to submit to or even collude with their own subordination' (Jaggar, 1983, p. 149). In the contemporary analytic feminist literature, the primary explanation for why women become complicit in their own subordination is offered in terms of adaptive preferences. 1 This explanation holds that because of the deprived and oppressive social context in which they find themselves, women develop preferences which reflect this deprivation and oppression, and so end up reinforcing rather than resisting their own subordination. In this paper, I argue that adaptive preferences are not the only way in which complicity can arise. I develop a phenomenological explanation of complicity, which offers a new account of some of the ways in which and reasons why agents may be complicit in their own subordination. I begin by examining the dominant features of the explanation from adaptive preference. I highlight that the approach from adaptive preference assumes that agents have a natural trajectory away from subordination and towards flourishing, and thus, without 'impositions', such as social constraints or other forms of interference that