Contemporary philosophical discussions of sexual ethics focus heavily on questions of autonomy, agency, and the moral power of consent. Since the late 1980s, moral and legal theorists have debated the conditions of moral validity for sexual consent, while feminist social and legal theorists have for even longer criticized social practices and institutional structures that undermine the agency of women to steer their sexual lives. Common across these discussions is the hope that respect for another's freedom, autonomy, or will can prevent the harm of objectification, that is, treating another merely as a sexual object or means. The task of sexual ethics, on the conventional view, becomes reconciling one's grasp of another as an object of erotic desire with the moral authority of their subjectivity. This generally involves placing their subjectivity above their status as object, so as to avoid the danger of objectification. However, we are always both subject and object in our encounters with others. As a result, theorists disregard essential, morally relevant features of intimacy when they locate the moral significance of another only in their active subjectivity. In this chapter, we argue for a methodological adjustment to sexual ethics that widens the narrow focus on freedom, autonomy, and agency to address the moral significance of being an erotic object as well. Drawing on phenomenology, particularly the insights of Simone de Beauvoir, we propose an approach that recognizes a constitutive ambiguity between the freedom appropriate to subjectivity and the phenomenon of being an erotic object in intimate encounters. While we are committed to the Preproof.