Bayesianism and self-doubt

Abstract

How should we respond to evidence when our evidence indicates that we are rationally impaired? I will defend a novel answer based on the analogy between self-doubt and memory loss. To believe that one is now impaired and previously was not is to believe that one’s epistemic position has deteriorated. Memory loss is also a form of epistemic deterioration. I argue that agents who suffer from epistemic deterioration should return to the priors they had at an earlier time. I develop this argument regarding memory loss then extend it to cases of self-doubt.

Rational Aversion to Information

“…discusses uncertainty about updating in the context of epistemic logic.Christensen (2007, p. 3) defends the broader claim that "even an agent who is in fact cognitively perfect might, it would seem, be uncertain of this fact". Similar ideas are defended by many others, includingCarr (2019),Bradley (2020), andDorst (2020).15Diaconis and Zabell (1982) discuss this passage. Of course, the general idea is much more broadly recognized.…”