Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution

Abstract

Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a constitutively normative state, i.e. a state that is grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of proprioceptive knowledge, memorial knowledge, and self‐evident knowledge are cases of knowledge that are not grounded in the possession of reasons. I refer to these as cases of basic knowledge. The existence of basic knowledge forms a primary objection to the idea that knowledge is a constitutively normative state. In what follows I offer a way through the apparent dilemma of having to choose between either basic knowledge or the normativity of knowledge. The solution involves homing in on a state of awareness (≈non‐accidental true representation) that is distinct from knowledge and which in turn grounds the normativity of knowledge in a way that is fully consistent with the existence of basic knowledge. An upshot of this is that externalist theories of knowledge turn out to be fully compatible with the thesis that knowledgeable beliefs are always beliefs that are justified by the reasons one possesses.

Ignorance and awareness

“…A second concrete proposal for awareness has been advanced by Michael Huemer (2001:51-57) and Paul Silva (2021Silva ( , 2022Silva ( , 2023. Both hold that being aware of the fact that p is non-accidentally representing the fact that p: Awareness = Non-Accidental True Representation (A = NATR): S is aware of the fact that p iff p, S represents the fact that p, and S's representation of that fact is suitably non-accidental.…”

“…He argues only that the relevant notion must exclude a significant degree of chance or coincidence. Silva (2021Silva ( , 2022Silva ( , 2023 agrees, pointing out that reliabilist virtue-theoretic conditions and safety-theoretic conditions can effectively be generalized to apply to the total class of representational states, not just belief states. For one could take any non-accidentality condition applied to belief (a special case of representation) for the purposes of understanding knowledge, and then take that knowledgerelevant non-accidentality condition and apply it to representational states more generally (e.g.…”