Basic Intrinsic Value

Rossian totalism about intrinsic value

“…For given our understanding of basic intrinsic value states, two basic intrinsic value states of the same kind-say, someone taking pleasure in xshare the same intrinsic properties (cf. Feldman 2000). 17 Though on this reading Ross at least gathers the resources to solve the problem of vicious pleasures, he ends up saying something that simply makes hash of our guiding axiological assumptionsassumptions he himself took on board.…”

“…Third, I take it that speaking coherently about the intrinsic value of various states-of-affairs requires the notion of basic intrinsic value states as the most fundamental bearers of intrinsic value (cf. Feldman 2000). A basic intrinsic value state is a pure attribution of a core intrinsically valuable property or relation that has a determinate and indefeasible intrinsic value.…”

Good-making and organic unity

“…We have the propositionalists, who maintain that propositionally structured entities like states of affairs or facts are the fundamental value-bearers, and then we have the nonpropositionalists who maintain that entities like concrete objects or properties, are the fundamental value-bearers. There are several prominent value theoreticians in the propositionalist camp, Ross (1930) perhaps being the clearest early example, and among later philosophers there is what might be called the Chisholm school of value theory: Roderick Chisholm himself (1986), Feldman (2000), Lemos (1994), andZimmerman (2001). Among contemporary philosophers in the non-propositionalist camp a Kantian like Korsgaard (1983) might belong here, as does Anderson (1993), and Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003) have at least a foot in this camp.…”

“…Five minutes of pleasure might be divided into 5 min-long parts but also into 300 slong parts, and while all these parts might be considered as bearing value we cannot simultaneously consider them as contributing this value to the whole since that would involve double-counting. We might address this problem by identifying some atomic states (Feldman 2000), ones that cannot be further divided without ceasing to be bearers of value, but there might be cases where it is unclear what would constitute such atoms or cases where the choice between some different ways of cutting the thing up into parts just seems arbitrary. The problem of double-counting is however primarily a problem in the mathematics of value, i.e., in formulating a general method for the computation of value, we must do so in a way that precludes double-counting.…”

Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value

“…MAX has been rejected by some Mooreans (Lemos, 1994, pp. 61-66), but endorsed by Feldman (2000), Harman (1967) and Zimmerman (2001, p. 160). The ceteris paribus clause in BET is important.…”